Africa Overview
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“We, the African leaders attending the meeting between the G8 and Africa, are deeply distressed by the terrorist attacks that occurred in London yesterday, 7 July 2005.  We are particularly saddened by the loss of life and seize this opportunity to condemn in no uncertain terms such mindless acts of terrorism.  We are pleased that our interlocutors have affirmed their resolve not to be diverted by these terrorist acts. We join them in that resolve.  We convey our heartfelt sympathy to the bereaved families and the government of the United Kingdom, and we reaffirm our solidarity in the fight against terrorism.”
   Olusegun Obasanjo, President of Nigeria
G8 Summit, Gleneagles
July 8, 2005
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A small number of al-Qaida operatives in East Africa, particularly Somalia, continued to pose the most serious threat to American and allied interests in the region.  Though it is unclear to what extent terrorist groups were present and operating in west and central Africa, the fundraising, terrorist recruiting, and other support activities of al-Qaida and affiliated persons and groups in South Africa, Nigeria, and across the Trans-Sahara region remained a serious concern.  Terrorist recruitment within the Trans-Sahara, and increasing signs of cooperation between terrorist organizations and al-Qaida, was another disturbing trend.  Hizballah continued to engage in fundraising activities in Africa, particularly in West Africa, but did not engage in any terrorist attacks within the region.  Anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric from Islamic radicals grew in Africa in 2005.  Many African governments improved their cooperation and strengthened their efforts in the war on terrorism.  Both the African Union (AU) and African regional organizations undertook initiatives to improve counterterrorism cooperation and information sharing.

There were few significant international terrorist incidents in Africa, but civil conflict and ethnic violence continued in a number of countries.  On June 4, members of the Sahel faction of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) attacked the remote Mauritanian military outpost at el-Mreiti, killing at least 15 Mauritanian soldiers and wounding at least an equal number.  The Mauritanian Government launched military operations, in cooperation with Algeria and Mali, against the GSPC terrorists.  Those operations resulted in several clashes with the GSPC and inflicted an unknown number of casualties on the terrorist organization.   

Members of the GSPC continued to operate in the Sahel region, crossing difficult-to-patrol borders between Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, and Chad to recruit extremists within the region for training and terrorist operations in the Trans-Sahara, and possibly for operations outside the region.  With the help of USG-funded training, these countries have increasingly cooperated against the GSPC.  

The situation in Somalia remained a concern, as the country’s unsecured borders and political instability provided a potential transit point and safe haven for terrorists. 

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) is a multi-faceted, multi-year strategy aimed at defeating terrorist organizations by strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region’s security forces, promoting democratic governance, discrediting terrorist ideology, and reinforcing bilateral military ties with the United States.  The overall goals are to enhance the indigenous capacities of governments in the pan-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Chad, and Niger, as well as Nigeria and Senegal) to confront the challenge posed by terrorist organizations in the region, and to facilitate cooperation between those countries and our Maghreb partners (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) in the global war on terror.

The need for TSCTI stemmed from concern over the potential for expansion of operations by Islamic terrorist organizations in the Sahel.  TSCTI was developed as a follow-on to the very successful Pan-Sahel Initiative, which focused solely on the states of the Sahel.  Ongoing concern that Islamist terrorists continue to seek to create safe havens and support networks in the remote expanses of the Sahel, as well as the public affiliation of some terrorist groups with al-Qaida, led to its formal approval by the U.S. Government in early 2005.

TSCTI was originally envisioned as a five-year program based on counterterrorism, democratic governance assistance, a public diplomacy component, and military assistance. 

TSCTI’s main elements include:

· Counterterrorism (CT) programs to create a new regional focus for trans-Saharan cooperation, including use of established regional organizations like the African Union and its new Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism in Algiers.  These programs include training to improve border and aviation security and overall CT readiness;
· Continued specialized Counterterrorism Assistance Training and Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) activities in the trans-Sahara region and possible regional expansion of those programs;
· Public diplomacy programs that expand outreach efforts in the Sahel and Maghreb regions, Nigeria, and Senegal and seek to develop regional programming embracing this vast and diverse region.  Emphasis is on preserving the traditional tolerance and moderation displayed in most African Muslim communities and countering the development of extremism, particularly in youth and rural populations;
· Democratic governance programs that strive, in particular, to provide adequate levels of USG support for democratic and economic development in the Sahel, strengthening those states to withstand internal threats; and
· Military programs intended to expand military-to-military cooperation, to ensure adequate resources are available to train, advise, and assist regional forces, and to establish institutions promoting better regional cooperation, communication, and intelligence sharing.

African Union

The African Union (AU) has several counterterrorism legal instruments, including a Convention on Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999), a 2002 Protocol to the Convention, and a 2004 Plan of Action.  The Addis Ababa-based AU Commission provided guidance to its 53 member states' ratification and implementation of continental and international counterterrorism commitments; it also coordinated assistance to cover member states’ counterterrorism gaps.
U.S. Army Sergeant Kristine Smedley, a CJTF-HOA member, administers the oral version of the polio vaccine to a student in Djibouti in September.  CJTF-HOA, along with the World Health Organization and USAID, assisted the Djiboutian Government in implementing a polio prevention campaign from May through September.  (U.S. Air Force Senior/Airman Jason Piatek)

AU member state and regional "focal points" for counterterrorism approved the AU's African Center for Study and Research on Terrorism's (ACSRT) program of action in June.  The Algiers-based ACSRT was inaugurated in October 2004 to serve as a think tank, an information collection and dissemination center, and a regional training center.  The AU is working with member states to eliminate redundancies between the ACSRT and the Committee on Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA), which was established at the January AU Summit in Abuja.  The Department of State and the National Defense University's Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) collaborated with the AU to run counterterrorism workshops.

With Danish funding, the AU recently hired a consultant to draft a counterterrorism Model Law to serve as a template.  This would assist member states in drafting legislation to implement counterterrorism commitments.  The Model Law will also address money laundering and other terrorism-related topics.

The AU maintained that Africa's colonial legacy made it difficult to accept a definition of terrorism that excluded an exception for "freedom fighters."  Still, the AU is on record strongly condemning acts of terrorism, such as those that occurred in Sharm El Sheik, Egypt, and London.

Although AU Commission political will to act as an effective counterterrorism partner is strong, capacity remains relatively weak.  The AU seeks to create a counterterrorism unit at its headquarters to promote member state counterterrorism efforts more effectively.  The AU welcomes technical and financial assistance from international partners/donors to bolster both AU headquarters and ACSRT activities approved by member states.  AU counterterrorism websites are www.africa-union.org/terrorism/terrorism2.html and www.caert.org.dz.

Comoros

International terrorism concerns in Comoros focused upon Comorian national Fazul Abdullah Mohammed (a.k.a. Harun Fazul), suspected of involvement in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa.  His whereabouts are unknown, but he may have continued contacts in and/or travel to Comoros. 

It is possible that terrorist suspects transited or sought safe haven in Comoros, as Comorian security forces had limited resources and training in counterterrorism and maritime security.  The government has shown a consistent effort to improve its counterterrorism measures, including participation in U.S. training programs and cooperation with the Rewards for Justice Program. 

The Comorian Government and local religious leaders disapprove of Islamic extremism and have stopped taking money from suspect Islamic charities.  In an effort to discourage students from attending radical schools abroad, the government established the University of Comoros in 2003.

Djibouti

Djibouti hosted the only U.S. military base in Sub-Saharan Africa, along with forces from other Coalition nations, and remained a staunch supporter of U.S. and Coalition counterterrorism efforts.  Djibouti was one of the most forward-leaning Arab League members supporting ongoing efforts against terrorism. 

President Ismail Omar Guelleh and many top leaders in Djibouti repeatedly expressed their country's full and unqualified support for the global war on terror.  Djibouti was one of the very first Arab League nations to do so, even in the face of adversity and criticism from its neighbors.  President Guelleh publicly expressed his support and was responsive to all U.S. requests.

U.S. security personnel continued to work closely with Djiboutian counterparts to monitor intelligence and follow up prospective terrorism-related leads.  This close relationship developed into a network of information with immediate and positive results.  While their capabilities were limited, Djiboutian counterparts were very proactive, and were highly receptive and responsive to U.S. requests for cooperation. 

The Djiboutian National Security Services took extraordinary measures with its limited resources to ensure the safety and security of American citizens, the U.S. Embassy, and the U.S. military base at Camp Lemonier. 

Ethiopia

Ethiopia devoted high-level attention to the fight against terrorism and continued its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States.  As evidence of its political will to fight terrorism, the Government of Ethiopia agreed to a number of new initiatives and continued to cooperate in efforts to collect and share intelligence on terrorist groups.  As a developing nation with constrained resources in a volatile region, Ethiopia has limited, but increasing, capabilities to address terrorism threats.  Draft counterterrorism legislation is currently before Parliament for approval. 

Ethiopia did not provide sanctuary or offer political or financial support to any terrorist groups, and there were no significant terrorist incidents directed against U.S. citizens in Ethiopia.  Ethiopia made a concerted effort to eliminate the ability of any terrorist groups to operate in the country.  U.S. Army Special Forces and the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) continued to provide training to enhance Ethiopian border patrol and security skills.   The Ethiopian Government enhanced physical security, conducted investigations, and provided protective surveillance in response to threat information directed at U.S. citizens.

Ethiopia accommodated requests for arrest warrants on terrorist suspects if local evidence of wrongdoing existed.  The country has a good record of cooperation on extradition requests.  Ethiopia is expanding the modern immigration security system installed with USG assistance at Addis Ababa Bole International Airport.

U.S. Navy Hospitalman 2nd Class Miami Gollyhorn, a Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) respiratory therapist, examines a child during the Medical Civil Assistance Project in Gode, Ethiopia, in November.  The CJTF-HOA members treated more than 1,200 people during a three-day assistance project.  (U.S. Air Force Photo/Senior Airman Jason Piatek)
The highest levels of the Ethiopian Government displayed increased recognition of Ethiopia's vulnerability to financial crimes, including terrorist financing and counterfeiting.  The penal code passed in 2005 criminalized money laundering and a number of other financial crimes for the first time.  Officials from the Ethiopian Department of Justice attended a Department of Treasury and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) anti-money laundering (AML) seminar in Addis Ababa.  The Central Bank (National Bank of Ethiopia) drafted specific AML legislation that included establishment of a Financial Intelligence Unit.  Ethiopian PM Meles declared hawalas, an informal money-transfer system, illegal following the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, and Ethiopia continued to take action aimed at eliminating the ability of hawalas to function as terrorist financing centers.

Ethiopia's recently renamed National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS, formerly known as SIRA) combined the duties of counterparts to the CIA, FBI, DHS, BICE, State/Consular Affairs, and the Secret Service.  NISS was responsible for overall counterterrorism management.  Federal and local police counterterrorism capabilities were primarily focused on response to terrorist incidents.

Ethiopia actively participated in African Union (AU) counterterrorism efforts, nominated a focal point for the AU's Center for Study and Research on Terrorism, and participated in meetings of the new Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa.  Ethiopia ratified AU counterterrorism conventions and protocols.  In addition, Ethiopia was activein Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) counterterrorism efforts.

Kenya

The Government of Kenya continued to cooperate with the United States in identifying terrorist groups operating within Kenya.  However, more work remains to be done in domestic areas such as law enforcement, enacting counterterrorism legislation, and prosecution of alleged terror suspects.

Kenya registered little to no progress toward the overall strengthening of its capabilities to combat terrorism, prosecute terror suspects, or respond to emergencies.  The Government of Kenya disbanded the U.S.-supported Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), set up in 2004 to improve police and prosecutors’ ability to cooperate on counterterrorism issues.  The Government of Kenya did not engage in a national discussion to sensitize the public to terrorism issues, nor did it finalize a national counterterrorism strategy. 

The Kenyan Government did arrest terrorist suspects and disrupt terrorist operations.  In November, four men were arrested in October for allegedly funding terror activities; and one man was arrested in December in Northeastern Province for possession of a rocket launcher and rocket-propelled grenades, with the alleged intent of smuggling them to Mombasa. 

In a setback to counterterrorist efforts, however, seven terror suspects -- arrested in November 2003 on charges related to the Kikambala hotel bombing and attempted shooting-down of an Israeli airplane in November 2002, the 1998 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, and a 2003 plot to attack the new U.S. Embassy -- were acquitted in June 2005.  No one was successfully prosecuted for these terrorist acts in 2005. 

There was insufficient coordination among police, prosecutors, and other relevant government ministries that deal with terrorism issues.  The U.S. Embassy’s Regional Security Officer, in conjunction with the State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program, continued to focus on increasing the Kenyan Government's capacity to effectively investigate and prosecute terrorism.

Kenya lacked counterterrorism legislation, and its current laws made it difficult to prosecute terror suspects.  For example, the Evidence Act of 2002 said that any confessions not made before a magistrate are inadmissible.  The government passed a “Miscellaneous Bill” that amended the Evidence Act.  The new law stated that a confession could be made in front of a judge, magistrate, or senior police officer.  The government redrafted the Suppression of Terrorism Bill after a two-year hiatus, but did not table the new bill in Parliament.

In April 2003, Kenya published a draft "Suppression of Terrorism Bill,” only to withdraw it after harsh criticism from human rights groups and Kenyan Muslim communities.  The Kenyan Government wrote a new draft but did not officially publish the document or submit it to Parliament.  In a similar fashion, Kenya drafted but has not yet submitted to Parliament the anti-money laundering and counterterrorism finance legislation needed to bring the country into compliance with relevant UN resolutions.

The Kenyan Government continued to improve aviation security through the Kenya Airport Authority (KAA) and the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA).  The FAA and TSA trained managers and inspectors to better oversee and maintain security procedures and planning.  However, consistent enforcement of security procedures and planning remained a challenge.  Under the Safe Skies program, the FAA helped Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania update and harmonize safety regulations to create a regional civil aviation safety structure and a regional civil aviation security structure.  The World Bank is also moving forward on projects to improve airport access controls, perimeter fencing, and the terminal building structure. 

Madagascar

President Ravalomanana reaffirmed Madagascar’s support for the global war on terror in speeches at the UN General Assembly, other international events, and domestic events.  International terrorism is a concern in all Indian Ocean nations because of the proximity of the Republic of Comoros, where terrorist suspects may transit or seek safe haven.  Madagascar's 3,000-mile coastline is inadequately monitored.  Limited equipment, personnel, and training for border control increased the risks of penetration.  The Ministry of Defense, with President Ravalomanana's support, is trying to take the lead on regional security in the Indian Ocean and has already made efforts to improve information sharing with its neighbors.

Malagasy police, military, intelligence, and security forces have little background and training in counterterrorism and maritime surveillance.  Despite limited resources, government officials were willing to cooperate with the United States; one example was the successful launch of the Rewards for Justice Program.  At the main port in Tamatave, which handles 80 percent of Madagascar’s maritime traffic, steps were taken to improve access control and overall security. 

The Ministry of Justice, with UN support, organized a three-day workshop in August to draft an action plan for the implementation of UN counterterrorism conventions and additional antiterrorism legislation to reinforce laws already in place. 

Mali

Mali worked to combat terrorism and was responsive on terrorist finance issues. The government regularly distributed terrorist finance watch lists to the banking system, but has not discovered or frozen any terrorist assets to date. 

The Malian Government was receptive to U.S. assistance in strengthening control of its borders and countering the presence of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in northern Mali.  The country was a principal recipient of Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) training and support.  Mali will continue to receive assistance through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative.

Malians practice a moderate form of Islam, and popular opinion condemns violence and terrorism in all forms, especially in the name of Islam.  Among the public at large, terrorism is generally perceived as a problem that does not affect Mali.  However, foreign Islamic preachers operate in the north, while mosques associated with Dawa, an Islamic fundamentalist sect, are located in Kidal, Mopti, and Bamako.  The Dawa sect has a particularly strong influence in Kidal.  In general, however, traditional and religious leaders reject extremist ideologies. 

Mauritania

Mauritania was an active participant in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), which builds upon the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI).  Mauritania's ability to conduct effective counterterrorism activities is severely limited by a lack of resources and funding.

On June 4, the GSPC attacked a remote Mauritanian military outpost at el-Mreiti, killing at least 15 Mauritanian soldiers and wounding an equal number.  This attack sparked a strong reaction by then-President Maaouiya Ould Taya that included unprecedented military cooperation with the neighboring countries of Mali and Algeria to pursue the GSPC elements across the Malian desert. 

On August 3, while President Taya was out of the country, a small group of senior security and military officers led by Col. Ely Ould Mohamed Fal, the head of the national police, successfully carried out a coup d'etat.  This group, known as the Military Council for Justice and Democracy (CMJD), cemented its authority after the coup.  Nevertheless, it announced its intention to turn power over to a democratically elected government by May 2007.  A presidential election is scheduled for March 2007.  The coup and its aftermath had an impact on the government’s counterterrorism efforts and the USG’s ability to support those efforts. 

Following the August coup, the transitional government took several positive steps towards creating an inclusive political environment where moderate Islamic groups can participate in the political process.  In September, the transitional government announced a general amnesty that freed more than 100 political opposition figures, many of whom were in prison at the time.  The transitional government also released, for lack of evidence, more than 40 Islamists arrested under the Taya regime.  Nineteen other Mauritanian Islamists with reported links to terrorism remained behind bars pending trial.

Under President Taya, the government initiated an aggressive crackdown on Islamic groups that it deemed a threat to Mauritania's security and stability, and arrested numerous Islamists.  It was not always the case, however, that the individuals arrested were promoting extremism and violence as much as that they represented opposition to, and competition with, the former government. 

Both the transitional government and the former government placed a priority on protecting U.S. citizens and interests and routinely provided investigative assistance to resolve potential threats.  Although no Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) existed between the United States and Mauritania, it is likely that the present transitional government would facilitate any U.S. requests for assistance. 

Mauritania's transitional government faced terrorist threats from two groups:  the GSPC and the Mauritanian Group for Preaching and Jihad (GMPJ).  The GSPC presented a heightened threat to the Government of Mauritania and an emerging threat to the limited U.S. interests in the region because of its possible cooperation with al-Qaida through Zarqawi and other terrorist groups in the trans-Sahara region.

The GMPJ is a newer terrorist organization that was founded in 2000 by Ahmed Ould el-Khory.  The exact size and areas of operation for the GMPJ are unknown, but its focus appears to be Mauritania.  Several of the 19 Islamists currently in prison in Nouakchott are purportedly members of the GSPC or the GMPJ and are accused of direct or indirect association with terrorist activities. 

Nigeria

Nigeria has taken a leading counterterrorism role in West Africa, the sub-region where its diplomatic and political influence is most pronounced.  Nigeria took the lead in the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) and the African Union in sponsoring joint intelligence and security conferences on counterterrorism.  The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), an organization founded by President Obasanjo and other African heads of state, condemned terrorism and called for African nations to take concrete measures to combat it.

Nigerian security services were particularly cooperative and proactive when asked to investigate potential terrorist threats to U.S. interests.  Nigerian intelligence and security services worked hard to improve intelligence sharing on counterterrorism issues, and the Nigerian military worked to establish units with counterterrorism capability.

Nigeria consistently lent diplomatic support to Coalition efforts against the Taliban and al-Qaida, despite the domestic political ramifications in a country that is home to Africa's largest Muslim population.

Nigeria backed UN Resolutions 1267, 1333, and 1368.  It also initiated legislative and regulatory steps to shore up its anti-money laundering regime to fight terrorism. 

While current criminal law does not contain specific counterterrorism provisions, the penal code proscribed acts of violence that include terrorism.  In August, the Nigerian cabinet approved a draft counterterrorism bill and sent it to the National Assembly for consideration.  Under the new legislation, anyone convicted of a terrorist offense could be sentenced up to 35 years in prison.  However, the National Assembly had not acted on the bill by the end of 2005.

There was no special examining magistrate with specific powers in the counterterrorism area.  In Nigeria, suspects by law must be charged within 48 hours, but in practice can be held as long as deemed necessary.  Most criminals are photographed and fingerprinted by security elements, but DNA samples are not taken due to resource constraints and a lack of scientific knowledge.

While the Nigerian Government does not support international terrorism or terrorists, there are some individuals and private groups in Nigeria with ties to terrorist sources in Sudan, Iran, Pakistan, and Libya.  Members of terrorist groups, including al-Qaida and the GSPC, have operated and recruited in Nigeria.

Rwanda

The Rwandan Government made efforts to combat terrorism financing and continued to increase its border control measures to identify potential terrorists.  Rwanda has an intergovernmental counterterrorism committee and a counterterrorism reaction team in its police intelligence unit.  Central Bank and Ministry of Finance officials continued to provide outstanding cooperation on terrorist financing issues.  Rwanda participated in regional initiatives on international counterterrorism cooperation, including active participation in the East African Stand-by Brigade.

The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR, known as the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda, ALIR, until 2001) -- an armed rebel force, including former soldiers and supporters of the previous government that orchestrated the 1994 genocide -- continued to operate in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  Rwanda pressed for international action to pursue the FDLR.  An ALIR unit was responsible for the kidnapping and murder of nine persons, including two U.S. tourists, in Bwindi Park in 1999.  The Rwandan Government continued to assist U.S. law enforcement officials seeking to prosecute three suspects in the attack who were transferred to the United States for prosecution in 2003.  The Rwandan Government provided original documents requested by the U.S. Justice Department and allowed two Rwandan officials to travel to the United States to testify at the trial of the suspects.  The suspects await trial.

Senegal

The Government of Senegal’s law enforcement and intelligence entities responded appropriately to all perceived terrorism threats, and shared information with U.S. counterparts.  Senegal’s continued support of the global war on terror has furthered Senegal's reputation as an example of political and religious moderation in the Muslim world. 

Secretary Rice and Senegalese Foreign Minister Cheikh Tidiane Gadio during a joint press conference at the U.S.-Sub Saharan Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum (AGOA) in Dakar in July.  (AFP Photo/Seyllous)
As beneficiaries of the TSCTI, Senegalese officials received training from the U.S. ATA program, hosted the command post portion of U.S. European Command (EUCOM)–sponsored Operation Flintlock, and participated in a EUCOM-sponsored seminar in Ghana on conflict prevention and combating terrorism.

President Abdoulaye Wade met several times with Imam Mamour Fall, a Senegalese cleric deported from Italy in 2003 for publicly praising Bin Ladin and terrorism, to firmly counsel “moderation.”  President Wade also criticized members of the Senegalese press for inaccurately exaggerating the level of public support for extremism.

The Government of Senegal affirmed its commitment to USG-assisted efforts to augment its border security.  However, lack of computer literacy within the police forces and problems with local technical support posed obstacles.  Senegal's borders remained porous and ill-equipped to prevent cross-border traffic for illicit purposes.

The Government of Senegal eschewed law enforcement and/or military action that it perceived might renew conflict with Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC) rebels in the Casamance region of southern Senegal.

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone’s armed forces focused on border control, as incursions resulting from potential unrest in neighboring countries remained a threat.  Sierra Leone did not identify any terrorist organizations within its borders. 

Somalia

Somalia’s lack of a functioning central government, protracted state of violent instability, long unguarded coastline, porous borders, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula made it a potential location for international terrorists seeking a transit or launching point to conduct operations elsewhere.

Regional efforts to bring about national reconciliation and establish peace and stability in Somalia are ongoing.  Although the ability of Somali local and regional authorities to carry out counterterrorism activities is constrained, some have taken limited actions in this direction.

While numerous Islamist groups engaged in a broad range of activities operate inside Somalia, few of these organizations have any known links to terrorist activities.  Movements such as Harakat al-Islah (al-Islah), Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa (ASWJ), and Majma Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaliya (Majma') sought power by political rather than violent means and pursued political action via missionary or charity work.  Missionary Islamists, such as followers of the Tablighi sect and the “New Salafis” generally renounce explicit political activism.  Other Islamist organizations became providers of basic health, education, and commercial services, and were perceived by some as pursuing a strategy to take political power.

In the 1990s, members of the Somalia-based al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) periodically committed terrorist acts, primarily in Ethiopia.  AIAI rose to prominence following the collapse of Somalia’s central government in 1991, with the goal of creating a pan-Somali Islamic state in the Horn of Africa.  In recent years the existence of a coherent entity operating as AIAI has become difficult to prove.  At most, AIAI was highly factionalized and diffuse, and its membership difficult to define.  Some elements associated with the former AIAI are sympathetic to al-Qaida and maintained ties with it, and may continue to pose a threat to U.S. and Western interests in the region.

Other shadowy groups that have appeared in Somalia are suspected of having committed terrorist acts against Western interests in the region, or considered capable of doing so.  Very little is known about movements such as al-Takfir wal-Hijra (al-Takfir), but the extremist ideology and violent character of takfiri groups elsewhere suggest that the movement merits close monitoring.

South Africa

South Africa publicly continued to support the global war on terror, and shared financial, law enforcement, and limited intelligence information with the United States.  President Mbeki on several occasions voiced his opinion that "no circumstances whatsoever can ever justify resorting to terrorism."  Members of Parliament from all political parties, including Muslim legislators, have echoed Mbeki's sentiments.  South Africa, however, has resource constraints that limited the extent of its ability to fund its counterterrorist initiatives. 

The South African Parliament adopted broad counterterrorism legislation under the title "Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Bill" on November 12, 2004.  President Mbeki signed the legislation in April and put it into effect May 2.  Both the ruling ANC and opposition parties in both chambers of South Africa's bicameral legislature supported the final version of the bill.  The Act clearly defined terrorism and specifically criminalized terrorist activities in application of South Africa’s international obligations.  It also prescribed penalties of up to 15 years in prison or a fine up to R100 million ($18 million) for those convicted.  Small revisions protecting the rights of strikers and protesters were inserted during final deliberation on the bill, which was regarded as a strong step forward in South Africa's counterterrorism efforts.  Additionally, the government's Financial Intelligence Center, established in 2003, received 15,757 suspicious transaction reports between April 1, 2004, and March 31, 2005. 

Fraudulent documents remained a significant problem for South African authorities.  Although South African documents often contain good security measures, efforts to limit the accessibility of passports and identity documents to potential terrorists are limited by resources and corruption in the Department of Home Affairs.

The South African Government distinguishes between "terrorist organizations" and "liberation movements," as the ruling African National Congress was long branded a terrorist group during the struggle against apartheid.  Popular attitudes generally reflect that distinction. 

It is unclear to what extent terrorist groups were present in South Africa.  Many analysts believed al-Qaida and other extremist groups have a presence within South Africa's generally moderate Muslim community for fundraising and other support activities.  The South African Government did not extend diplomatic recognition or provide any material assistance to terrorists.

Tanzania

Tanzania took significant steps to establish a National Counterterrorism Center.  The purpose of this Center was to build Tanzania's capacity to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks.  The Center included members of the police and military.

Tanzania continued to work closely with the United States to disrupt terrorist networks and prevent further acts of terrorism.  Tanzanian law enforcement cooperated with the United States to exchange evidence and testimony on cases related to the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy.

Tanzania continued to participate in several multi-year programs to strengthen its law enforcement and military capacity, improve aviation and border security, and combat money laundering and terrorist financing.  Tanzania's police force continued to participate in numerous training courses as part of a long-term effort to build Tanzania's law enforcement capacity.  Through the ATA program and the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA), more than 100 police officers trained in courses including criminal investigation, crisis response, and combating transnational terrorism and small arms trafficking.

Tanzania's military increased its participation in the Department of Defense-sponsored Counterterrorism Fellowship Program.  Participation in the program will enable Tanzania to develop a cadre of military officers trained in combating terrorism.

The Tanzanian Government’s Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Tanzania showed ongoing willingness to combat terrorist financing.  Tanzania cooperated with the United States and complied with its obligations under UNSC resolutions. 

From January through May, Tanzania's national multi-disciplinary committee on anti-money laundering finalized the draft Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Bill, and then  presented the bill to the Cabinet in May.  Because of short timelines and scheduled elections, the Cabinet delayed approval and tabling of the AML legislation in Parliament.

Tanzanian law enforcement and security forces attempted to identify and monitor terrorist activities and deny use of Tanzanian territory as a safe haven for terrorists.  The government is aware that terrorists may use Tanzania's territory for transit purposes.

Uganda

Uganda had a strong regional voice in opposing international terrorism and supported U.S. counterterrorism initiatives.

Since 1987, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony, has waged an insurgency in northern Uganda, using camps in southern Sudan as bases for attacks on government forces and civilians.  In 2005, a significant LRA force moved from southern Sudan to the Democratic Republic of Congo, where it remains.  The LRA’s tactics include murder, looting, burning houses, torture, mutilation, and abduction of children for the purposes of forced conscription, labor, and sexual servitude.  The LRA is on the U.S. Terrorist Exclusion List.

Between October 25 and November 8, the LRA attacked six NGO or expatriate vehicles. Until then, the LRA had rarely attacked expatriates or international aid agency personnel.

There were concerns in Uganda that these attacks represented the deliberate targeting of international interests, possibly in response to the indictment of Kony and three others by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The Government of Uganda deployed an estimated 45,000 troops in northern Uganda to protect civilians and combat the LRA.  Uganda and Sudan also expanded an agreement that permitted the Ugandan military to attack LRA units operating in southern Sudan.

For the past several years, technical advisors from the U.S. Department of Treasury have worked with the Bank of Uganda to draft anti-money laundering legislation.  The legislation was written but has not passed.  The Bank of Uganda has the power to freeze the assets of specific terrorist entities designated as terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida, pursuant to the Antiterrorism Act of 2002.  Uganda is also a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), a FATF-style regional body of 14 countries that holds periodic anti-money laundering/counterterrorist financing strategy workshops at the ministerial level.

Zimbabwe

Despite the strained bilateral relationship with the United States and the Government of Zimbabwe’s self-imposed isolation on most diplomatic issues, local intelligence and criminal investigative agencies to date have been very responsive to USG needs and concerns on terrorism issues.  At the U.S. Embassy’s request, these agencies have routinely provided assistance by conducting investigative inquiries, traces, and border checks of individuals considered threats to USG facilities or personnel. 

East Asia and Pacific Overview
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“From the murder of 88 Australians in Bali in October 2002 and the attack on our Jakarta Embassy last September, we know that the threat to our country is very real.  Australia’s national security depends upon a collective response to this terrorist threat.  Strong links with our partners in Asia form a vital part of this response.  The war on terror is a different kind of war.  It is a war against loose networks, neither dependent on nation-state sponsors, nor responsive to conventional deterrents.
 John Howard, Prime Minister of Australia
Address to the Lowy Institute for International Policy
  March 31, 2005
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East Asian countries made significant progress in 2005 creating a regional environment inhospitable to terrorists.  Despite these steps forward, however, the October 1 triple suicide bombing attack on the Indonesian resort island of Bali demonstrated that the terrorist threat persists in Asia.  In February, the Philippines suffered when three bombs went off almost simultaneously in different cities -- Manila, Davao, and General Santos City.

Southeast Asia remained a major front in the global war on terror, and continued to be an attractive theater of operations for regional terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiya (JI).  A clearer picture of the linkages between JI cells and some indigenous Islamic extremist groups emerged during the last year as a result of testimony in terrorist court cases and investigations by authorities.

The governments in Southeast Asia were reliable partners in the global war on terror but face challenges.  Geography makes effective border control problematic for archipelagic states like Indonesia and the Philippines.  Terrorists continued to adapt their tactics as well.  Because terrorism in Southeast Asia is a transnational problem, capacity building in a regional context emerged as a priority, in addition to the need for national capacity building.  Institutes like the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT) in Malaysia and the U.S.-Thailand Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok continued to expand their activities to provide effective counterterrorism training to law enforcement officers throughout the region.  Likewise, the Australian-Indonesian Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) is a promising additional regional center for capacity building.  Multilateral fora, including the United Nations Security Council’s Counterterrorism Committee (UNCTC), the G8’s Roma-Lyon and Counterterrorism Action Groups (CTAG), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), continued their important roles as key organizations for regional and transnational counterterrorism cooperation.

Australia remained a key counterterrorism partner.  Besides providing critical assistance to others in the region, it maintained a vigorous domestic counterterrorism posture.  On the domestic front, Australian police arrested 18 suspected terrorists in Sydney and Melbourne in November, thus disrupting a potential terrorist attack on Australian soil.  Australia enacted comprehensive counterterrorism legislation in December, enhancing the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to detect, detain, and prosecute suspected terrorists.  The Australian Ambassador for Counterterrorism continued to play a key role in strengthening the Australian Government’s engagement with regional partners and allies on counterterrorism.  Australia worked to strengthen the Asia-Pacific region’s counterterrorism capacity through a range of initiatives, both bilaterally and in regional groupings such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Pacific Island Forum (PIF).  Australia participated in a Trilateral Counterterrorism Dialogue with the United States and Japan.  In May, Australia announced a substantial four-year regional counterterrorism assistance package aimed at countering terrorist links and movements among the countries of maritime Southeast Asia.  In partnership with the United States, Australia continued to play a leading role in implementing the Regional Movement Alert List (RMAL) to strengthen the ability of countries to monitor the movement of people across borders.

Cambodia demonstrated effective measures to counter the threat of terrorism, despite legislative limitations.  The government cooperated with U.S. antiterrorist efforts on many levels.  In November, with U.S. assistance, Cambodia destroyed 36 SA-3 air defense missiles, thus removing the possibility of terrorists acquiring such weapons.  In close coordination with the United States, the government installed computerized border control systems at Cambodia’s international airports in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap and at its land border crossing points at Poipet and Koh Kong.  There were no terrorist incidents or known terrorist activities in 2005. 

China supported several operational and logistical aspects of the global war on terror, including signing a memorandum of understanding on the Department of Energy’s Megaports initiative to detect radiological materials and continuing its support for the Container Security Initiative.  Beijing also played an instrumental role in getting the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to issue a joint statement in 2005 on increasing regional cooperation to fight terrorism.  Outside China, Chinese citizens were victims of terrorist acts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Jordan.  China increased its efforts to build its domestic counterterrorism capabilities with a focus on improving security for the 2008 Beijing Olympics.  Beijing continued to express concern that terrorists operate on Chinese territory, and has said that some members of the Uighur minority in Xingjiang Province pose a threat to China’s domestic stability.

The Indonesian Government continued to take strong steps to counter the threat posed by the regional terrorist network Jemaah Islamiya (JI), which has ties to al-Qaida.  In March, Indonesian courts sentenced JI Emir Abu Bakar Ba’asyir to 30 months in prison for involvement in a “sinister conspiracy” to carry out the 2002 Bali attacks, but failed to convict him on any terrorist charges.  In August, the government granted Ba’asyir a four and a half-month reduction in sentence for good behavior in celebration of the 60th anniversary of Indonesian independence, but denied a further reduction in sentence in November at the end of the Muslim holiday of Ramadan.  The case is currently under judicial review.  The October 1 attacks on the resort island of Bali by three suicide bombers killed 20 people and injured more than 120, including six U.S. citizens, representing the worst terrorist bombing in Indonesia since the 2002 Bali bombings.  Assisted by the United States and other friendly countries, the ongoing Indonesian police investigation into the attacks led to the November 9 police raid on a terrorist safe house and the death of Malaysian bomb maker Azahari bin Husin in the ensuing shootout.  Azahari’s death ended a three-year manhunt and marked a victory for Indonesian counterterrorism efforts.

Japan strengthened its own counterterrorism measures by contributing to counterterrorism capacity-building among Asian countries and by participating in a trilateral counterterrorism dialogue with the United States and Australia.  Japan continues to reach outside the region in its fight against terrorism.  In October, the Japanese Diet (Parliament) extended for one year the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law that allows for Japan’s Self Defense Force (JSDF) to support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

The Malaysian Government strengthened border controls to ensure that separatist violence in southern Thailand does not spill over into Malaysia.  Leaders of both countries have stressed the importance of resolving the matter peacefully.  Malaysia also renewed 29 two-year detention orders of suspected terrorists, while nine such detainees were granted conditional release.

Thailand’s unwavering commitment to domestic and international counterterrorism efforts continued in 2005.  However, ongoing violence, fueled by a renewed separatist insurgency in southern Thailand, remains a concern.  The violence has been primarily focused in the three southernmost Muslim-majority provinces located along the Thai-Malaysian border.  There is no evidence of a direct connection between militants in southern Thailand and international terrorist organizations such as JI and al-Qaida.  There is concern, however, that these groups may attempt to capitalize on the increasingly violent situation for their own purposes.  

Australia

Australian police officials speak at a press conference in Sydney in November after foiling what they described as a "large-scale terrorist attack" in Sydney and Melbourne.  Officers arrested more than a dozen suspected terrorists.  (AFP Photo/Greg Wood)
Australia launched substantial initiatives and worked with its regional neighbors to assist in building their resolve and capacity to confront terrorism.  In November, Australian police arrested 18 suspected terrorists in Sydney and Melbourne, disrupting a potential terrorist attack on Australian soil.  Australia enacted comprehensive counterterrorism legislation in December, enhancing the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to detect, detain, and prosecute suspected terrorists.  The legislation featured new regimes for "preventative detention" of persons to prevent an imminent terrorist act as well as preserve evidence of a terrorist attack, and "control orders" that would allow the close monitoring of persons believed to pose a risk to the community.  It also strengthened offenses for financing terrorism, increased police investigative powers, and modernized and further defined the sedition offenses to cover those who urge the use of force or violence against other groups in the community.

Australia announced funds for other new security measures to enhance its ability to manage mass casualty incidents, including establishing unified policing at Australia's major airports.  It also created a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threat research facility and a chemical warfare agents laboratory network.

After the September release of the Wheeler Report on aviation security and policing at Australian airports, Australia announced substantial measures to tighten airport security, including establishing joint investigation teams, increasing Customs patrols, and strengthening air cargo security arrangements.  In December, Australia announced that it would establish a new division in the Attorney General's Department to coordinate background checks on people working in the secure areas of airports and seaports.  The new division will begin operation in July 2007.  Bolstering identity verification and security for Australian travelers, the government began issuing a new security-enhanced "e-passport" in October that includes a microchip with a digital picture and personal details of the passport holder.  In September, Australian federal and state governments also initiated a national action plan for counterterrorism that focused on combating extremism.

As a major component of protecting its national infrastructure, Australia opened the Joint Offshore Protection Command (JOPC) in March and began expanded security patrols of offshore areas, particularly oil and gas installations, which will detect threats to Australia's maritime assets and coastline.

Australia designated two additional terrorist organizations under its domestic criminal code, raising the total to 19.  The Australian Government has domestic counterterrorism forums, such as the National Counterterrorism Committee (NCTC).  The NCTC national exercise program tests, maintains, and strengthens Australia's counterterrorism and consequence management capabilities, command and control arrangements, and interoperability.  Australia has been a major partner of the United States in combating terrorist financing.  In 2005, the two nations jointly and successfully requested UN sanctions, including an asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo, for three leaders of JI and three leaders of the Abu Sayyaf Group.

Australia worked to strengthen the Asia-Pacific region's counterterrorism capacity through a range of initiatives in both bilateral and region groupings, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).  Australia was one of the first countries to sign the new Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism when it opened for signature in September at the United Nations Leaders' Summit.  Consistent with its international obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373, Australia had listed 550 terrorist-related individuals, entities, and organizations by the end of 2005.

The Australian Ambassador for Counterterrorism chairs the International Counterterrorism Coordination Group (ICTCG), Australia's interagency counterterrorism working group.  In May, Australia announced a four-year regional counterterrorism assistance package aimed at countering terrorist links and movements among the countries of maritime Southeast Asia, notably the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia.  The package included new measures that built on successful regional cooperation in law enforcement, border and transport security, intelligence, and legal affairs.  Key elements were developing effective counterterrorism legal frameworks in Southeast Asia, assisting the region with border control, strengthening fraud detection and immigration intelligence capabilities, enhancing law enforcement and intelligence cooperation capabilities, and bolstering transport security. 

Australia took the lead in law enforcement and legal issues working groups that developed practical measures to strengthen regional counterterrorism cooperation following the Bali Regional Ministerial meeting in 2004.  Australia also provided legal drafting assistance to regional states, including the South Pacific islands, seeking to adopt international conventions and protocols against terrorism and to bring their domestic laws into conformity with these conventions.  Australian law enforcement agencies also continued to build practical working-level relationships with their regional counterparts, particularly through the joint Australian-Indonesian Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) located in Semarang, Indonesia.  JCLEC is now fully operational as a counterterrorism training resource for the region, having offered more than 20 courses and trained more than 500 officers.  Twenty-eight countries have been involved with JCLEC.

Australia signed three additional bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on counterterrorism in 2005 with Brunei, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, raising the total to 12.  Other counterterrorism partners include Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Fiji, Cambodia, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, India, and East Timor.  This extensive network of bilateral MOUs supports practical and operational-level cooperation, and has proved beneficial.  For example, Australia's MOU with Indonesia provided the basis for cooperation between the Australian and Indonesian police in investigating the Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005, the Marriott hotel bombing of 2003, the Australian Embassy bombing of 2004.

Australia contributed an additional 450 troops to Iraq and 190 Special Forces personnel to Afghanistan in 2005. 

Prime Minister Howard led efforts to engage Australia's Muslim community to work together to combat extremism, holding a summit with prominent Muslim leaders in August.  PM Howard designated his Minister for Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs to continue a dialogue with the Muslim community, including Muslim youth.

Burma

Bilateral relations between Burma and the United States remain strained.  The Government of Burma’s willingness to cooperate and coordinate on antiterrorist activities within the country and throughout the region is minimal.  The government does not openly share information on state security issues and takes every precaution to project an image that it is exerting full authority over Burmese territory.  Sponsorship of terrorist organizations would be counterproductive to that goal.  Burmese Special Branch police recently created a new counterterrorism unit headquartered in Rangoon.  The United States relays to the government information from the United Nations on terrorist financing, which Burmese authorities then disseminate throughout the banking sector with instructions to report suspicious transactions.

Indigenous violence in Burma generally is targeted against the ruling regime rather than against U.S. citizens and facilities.  Various insurgent groups in ethnic minority areas near the borders with China, India, Bangladesh, Laos, and Thailand conduct small-scale actions against the Burmese authorities.  The government has attributed several bombings in the capital and elsewhere in recent years to domestic and exiled anti-regime elements. 

The Burmese judicial system is corrupt and lacks transparency.  The government defines almost all anti-regime activities as "acts of terrorism" and makes little distinction between peaceful political dissent and violent attacks by insurgents or criminals.  Suspected perpetrators of any acts that oppose the regime are subject to lengthy detention without trial or due process. 

Some observers posit possible links between known terrorist organizations and two local insurgent groups, the Rohingya Solidarity Organization and the Arakan Rohingya National Organization.  There are few signs that either group remains active, although the Burmese regime's severe repression of the Rohingya Muslim population inside Burma could foster sympathy with extremist methods and objectives.

On April 26, a bomb exploded in Mandalay's central market, Ze Gyo, killing two persons and injuring more than a dozen; no foreigners were among the casualties.  The Government of Burma claimed that the incident was a subversive act "committed by a group of insurgent destructive elements who wanted to disturb and destroy the stability of the state."  Authorities have not made public, however, any evidence of a genuine investigation or identified the specific perpetrators. 

On the afternoon of May 7, three devices exploded nearly simultaneously in downtown Rangoon at two busy shopping centers and at an official trade fair sponsored by the Government of Thailand.  The bombings were unprecedented in their scope and coordination killing over 25 people and injuring at least 200.  The Burmese Government again blamed the bombings on "anti-regime groups," individuals either domestically-based or living in exile.  It also accused the United States of secret involvement.  One of the Rangoon bombings occurred close to U.S. Embassy residences; two of the three bombs exploded at public supermarkets frequented by Americans, other expatriates, and middle-class Burmese.  There is no evidence indicating that the Rangoon bombings were directed against Americans or American interests; no Americans were injured or killed in the explosions.

Despite the spate of bombings, in October, the Burmese Government unilaterally reduced security coverage at all foreign missions in Rangoon.  In some cases, including in front of the U.S. Embassy, the government re-opened roads and lanes that had previously been closed to provide added protection against terrorist attacks.

Cambodia

Cambodia's ability to investigate independently potential terrorist activities is limited to an extent by a lack of training and resources.  An absence of comprehensive domestic legislation to combat terrorism also hinders the ability to arrest and prosecute terrorists.  That said, Cambodia's political leadership demonstrated a strong commitment to take aggressive legal action against terrorists.  The government also has made effective use of its existing one-page law on terrorism, as evidenced by the conviction in late December 2004 of six Jemaah Islamiya (JI) terrorists, each of whom was sentenced to life in prison.

To help bolster its counterterrorism capabilities, the Cambodian Government established the National Counterterrorism Committee (NCTC), a policy-level decision-making body chaired by the Prime Minister that directly addresses the government's domestic and international counterterrorism responsibilities.  The NCTC held its first session in August.  While the NCTC is a new entity that is still developing its operational capabilities, it is a strong indicator that the Cambodian Government takes counterterrorism seriously and is attempting to coordinate its efforts.

The government signed a bilateral agreement with India to enhance cooperation in combating the trafficking of drugs and arms, terrorism, and transnational crime.  The agreement, which came into force in December, provides for cooperation in fighting terrorism, exchanging information and intelligence on the activities of any terrorist group and its associates, and identifying and exchanging information on terrorist financing sources.  As ASEAN Chair from July 2002 to June 2003, Cambodia took the lead in coordinating ASEAN statements on terrorism, such as the Joint ASEAN-EU Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and the relevant text in the Chairman's Statement of the Tenth ASEAN Regional Forum.

Conditions in Cambodia, such as massive poverty, high unemployment, a poor education system, and disaffected elements within the Cham Muslim population, could make the country vulnerable to terrorists and terrorist influence in the future.  There are no indications that specific terrorist groups currently operate in Cambodia; however, porous borders and endemic corruption could make the country vulnerable to a terrorist presence.

The Cambodian Government fully cooperated with U.S. counterterrorism efforts on many levels, despite its limited resources.  In April, the government participated in the first-ever U.S. Pacific Command-led multinational interagency counterterrorism survey.  The survey was conducted to develop methods to assist the Cambodian authorities in improving their overall counterterrorism capacity.  The team made recommendations to various elements responsible for counterterrorism at the tactical, operational, and national levels.

In November, the Ministry of Defense, with U.S. assistance, destroyed 36 SA-3 air defense missiles to remove the possibility of these weapons being acquired by terrorist elements.  That same month, Cambodian authorities collected and dismantled two HNU-5 man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) from a police outpost.  These two MANPADS are scheduled for future destruction.

The government installed, with U.S. assistance, computerized border control systems at Cambodia's international airports in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap and at its land border crossing points at Poipet and Koh Kong.  The Cambodian Government cooperated fully with U.S. requests to monitor terrorists and terrorist entities listed as supporters of terrorist financing.

In impromptu remarks to the Cambodian Government-private sector forum on October 14, Prime Minister Hun Sen acknowledged that weapons from Cambodia have been transported to insurgent/terrorist groups in Sri Lanka and the Philippines, and to the ethnic Karen people in Burma.  The Prime Minister noted that a trial project to x-ray all incoming and outgoing containers at the port of Sihanoukville had met with difficulties and led to substantial delays in processing shipments, largely because the port's x-ray machine was too small.  Consequently, he requested foreign assistance to upgrade the port's x-ray facilities and said that in the interim manual inspections of containers would be conducted. 

China

Although there were no acts of terrorism committed in China in 2005, Chinese citizens were victims of terrorist acts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Thailand, and Jordan.

The United States and China held regular counterterrorism consultations; the most recent talks were in November.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs described U.S.-Chinese cooperation on counterterrorism as a key partnership promoting international stability and as a pillar of the bilateral relationship.  In January, China signed a memorandum of understanding with the Department of Energy to participate in the Megaports initiative on the detection of nuclear and radiological materials.  After signing the Container Security Initiative in 2003, the Chinese Government launched CSI programs in the ports of Shanghai and Shenzhen this year.  The program still faces challenges, but inspections have begun at the two ports. 

Chinese officials signed statements with counterterrorism components in regional fora such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN plus 3, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). 

China agreed to participate in APEC inspections of civilian airports to assess vulnerabilities, although it continues to raise objections to Taiwan’s participation in the initiative.  China has expressed concern, however, that APEC not expand beyond what Beijing considers to be the forum’s primary mandate of economic issues and trade liberalization.  China’s objections to Taiwan’s participation have impeded broader cooperation on APEC counterterrorism and nonproliferation initiatives.  China hosted an ARF Security Policy Conference and an ARF Seminar, where participants addressed non-traditional security threats, including counterterrorism issues.  As a founding member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China played an instrumental role in getting the SCO to issue a Joint Statement on increasing regional cooperation to fight terrorism, extremism, and separatism.

Although the Ministry of Public Security is responsible for criminal investigations, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) was designated the lead agency for all anti-money laundering activities in China.  China has taken steps to strengthen regulatory measures to combat money laundering, and is finalizing money laundering legislation designed to broaden the scope of existing anti-money laundering regulations and to establish more firmly the PBOC’s authority over national anti-money laundering operations.  Under the authority of the PBOC, China established a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in 2004 to track suspicious transactions and is working closely with FINCEN in the United States to develop its capabilities.  Additional measures are needed to ensure that China’s FIU is an independent, centralized body with adequate collection, analysis, and disseminating authority, including the ability to share information with FIUs in other jurisdictions.  The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), an organization also under the authority of the PBOC, is the primary agency for countering illicit foreign exchange transactions.

Joining the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) remains an important priority for China.  After joining the Eurasia FATF-style regional group (EAG) in late 2004, China was granted FATF observer status in 2005.  China’s money laundering legislation, when completed, will go a long way toward satisfying FATF’s criteria for membership.  However, China’s refusal to recognize the Egmont Group, an umbrella body coordinating the activities of over 100 FIUs worldwide, because the Group includes an FIU from Taiwan, remains a substantial obstacle to joining FATF. 

In December 2003, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security published a list of organizations and individuals that it claims have ties to terrorism.  One of the groups, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), was designated as an al-Qaida-affiliated terrorist organization under UNSCR 1267; the United States also designated the group under Executive Order 13224.   At a UNSC meeting in 2005, China's Permanent Representative to the United Nations called on UN members to adopt measures to crack down on "East Turkistan" terrorist forces.

There were several reports during the year of bombings and bomb threats in various parts of China.  It is unclear, however, whether these were politically motivated acts of terrorism or criminal attacks.  Although they did not publicly attribute any 2005 incident to terrorism, Chinese authorities asserted that terrorists, primarily based in Xinjiang Province, continued to operate clandestinely on Chinese territory.  The Chinese Government attempted to restrict foreign support for insurgent groups and increased the number of deployed security personnel in response to perceived terrorist activities in Xinjiang.

Formally established in 2004, the FBI Legal Attaché Office in Beijing bolstered U.S.-Chinese cooperation on counterterrorism investigations.  Chinese law enforcement responsiveness to terrorism investigation requests still needs improvement, but substantive intelligence has been obtained in some cases.  Chinese authorities actively participated in the investigation of the 2003 "Portland Six" case, providing hotel records and other information that proved instrumental in obtaining guilty pleas from the defendants in the case.  The United States does not have an extradition treaty with China.

China sent several officers to Greece for counterterrorism and Olympic security training; it also sent police chiefs to observe the 25th ASEAN Chief of National Police (APOL) Conference in Indonesia.  China continued to participate in training programs at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok, Thailand.  In 2005, China staged antiterror exercises in major cities throughout the country and implemented new antiterrorism training programs at several major police academies.

Hong Kong

Hong Kong’s implementation of the Container Security Initiative was transparent and cooperative.  The high level of cooperation and the successful implementation of CSI by Hong Kong Customs officials received praise from a congressional staff delegation, which described it as a model for CSI implementation. 

Hong Kong's Joint Financial Intelligence Unit (JFIU), operated by the Hong Kong Police and the Customs and Excise Department, is a member of the Egmont Group (a prominent body of FIUs that fosters international cooperation) and continued to process reports on suspicious financial transactions.  Hong Kong law enforcement agencies provided full support and cooperation to their overseas counterparts in tracing financial transactions suspected of being linked to terrorist activities.  Hong Kong actively participated in various anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing initiatives in 2005, including the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering.

As the primary reviewer of Indonesia's anti-money laundering and counterterrorism finance regime within the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering within the Asia Pacific/Group on Money Laundering, Hong Kong took the lead in co-coordinating the review group's on-site visit to Indonesia in January to examine its anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regime.  Hong Kong also participated in the FATF's mutual evaluation of Ireland in June.

To further promote international and regional understanding and cooperation on anti-money laundering and terrorist financing issues, Hong Kong hosted the International Conference on Combating Money Laundering in February 2005, as well as several international anti-money laundering and terrorist financing seminars and workshops.  These forums provided a good opportunity for representatives from government and other sectors to review progress and to share experience in tackling money laundering and terrorist financing challenges. 

Macau

In October, Macau submitted to its Legislative Assembly a new counterterrorism bill aimed at strengthening counterterrorist financing measures.  The bill, drafted to implement the provisions of UNSCR 1373, would make it illegal to conceal or handle finances on behalf of terrorist organizations.  Individuals would be liable even if they were not members of designated terrorist organizations themselves.  The legislation would also allow prosecution of persons who commit terrorist acts outside of Macau and mandate stiffer penalties.

The government also submitted a money laundering bill to the Legislative Assembly that, if passed and enforced, would strengthen its oversight.  Macau's financial system is governed by the 1993 Financial System Act and amendments, which lay out regulations to prevent use of the banking system for money laundering.  The new bill imposes requirements for the mandatory identification and registration of financial institution shareholders, customer identification, and external audits that include reviews of compliance with anti-money laundering statutes.

Financial regulatory authorities continued to direct financial institutions to conduct searches for terrorist assets using U.S. and UN lists.  Bank examiners reviewed customer profiles, large cash transaction records, and suspicious bank reports.  They also interviewed frontline staff, senior management, and money laundering compliance officers.

Indonesia

Following deadly terrorist bombings this year, the Indonesian Government, led by the country's first directly elected president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, demonstrated a new urgency on counterterrorism that could spawn needed institutional changes and a more comprehensive counterterrorism policy.  The Indonesian Government actively pursues the perpetrators of terrorist attacks.

President Yudhoyono's July appointment of a new National Police Chief, General Sutanto, led to strengthened support for needed police reform, anti-corruption steps, and focused counterterrorism measures.  Reform efforts included the December appointment of 13 new regional police chiefs.  In order to better track the use of cell phones, the government announced the mandatory registration of anonymous cell phone numbers effective in 2006.  Cell phone providers were reportedly drafting implementation plans at year's end.

Links among violent Islamic radicals and extremist organizations, including the regional terrorist network Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and its associates, remain a serious security threat to both Western and domestic targets in Indonesia.  These networks launched several terrorist attacks using connections often based on radical school ties and shared training experiences in Afghanistan, the southern Philippines, and Indonesia's Muslim-Christian violence in the former conflict areas of Maluku and central Sulawesi.  Indonesia joined other countries in co-sponsoring JI for UNSCR 1267 designation in 2002.

The Sulawesi and Maluku regions were the scene of  continued attempts apparently aiming to reignite inter-religious violence.  In May, violent extremists brutally attacked a remote police outpost on the island of Seram, killing five policemen and their cook.  Later that month, two bombs exploded in a market near Poso in central Sulawesi.  This largely Christian area experienced a grisly attack in late October when six masked men beheaded three teenage Christian schoolgirls and seriously injured a fourth.  In early November, two teenage schoolgirls, one Muslim and the other Christian, were critically wounded in the same region after being shot in the head by gunmen at a bus stop.  In late November, masked gunmen in Poso shot and wounded a Christian university professor and his wife as they returned home from church.  Although police investigations into all the Sulawesi incidents remain ongoing, by year's end no perpetrators had been charged by police in any of these incidents.

The simultaneous October 1 attacks on the resort island of Bali by three suicide bombers, which killed more than 20 and injured more than 120, including six Americans, represented the worst terrorist bombing in Indonesia since the 2002 Bali attacks.  The ongoing Indonesian police investigation into the attacks led to the November 9 police raid on a terrorist safe house in Malang, East Java, and the death of Malaysian bomb maker Azahari bin Husin in the ensuing shootout.  Azahari's death ended a three-year manhunt and marked a major victory for Indonesian counterterrorism efforts.  Azahari and JI recruiter Noordin Mohammed Top, a Malaysian, are suspected in nearly every major terrorist attack in Indonesia in the last five years, including the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings, the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, the 2003 J.W. Marriott hotel bombing, and the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing.  Indonesian police continued an intense manhunt for Noordin Top, who remains at large.

Building upon the death of Azahari and the discovery of 35 bombs ready for use, Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla has recruited prominent Muslim leaders to work in concert with the government to discourage youth from joining terrorist groups.  The Vice President has spoken publicly of the need for the government to monitor institutions closely associated with radicalism.  A number of Muslim leaders have publicly acknowledged that the bombings in Indonesia could not be justified on religious grounds.   Indonesian authorities remained committed to investigating terrorist networks and prosecuting those suspected of terrorist acts.

Special counterterrorism units within the police still played the lead role in conducting counterterrorism investigations, though the previously power-wielding Indonesian military and intelligence apparatus indicated eagerness to find new relevance by joining in the counterterrorism fight.

Since President Yudhoyono assumed office in October 2004, the police have arrested more than 50 suspected terrorists, including six key individuals and the field lieutenant of the Australian Embassy bombing.  In June and July, police arrested approximately 20 members of the JI-linked Islamic NGO Kompak, including terrorist financier Abdullah Sunata.  Within two months of the October suicide bombings in Bali, police had tracked down Azahari, identified the three suicide bombers, and arrested several other associates of Noordin and Azahari's network.  Despite major successes on the JI front, police and prosecutors had relatively little success in the arrest and prosecution of the perpetrators of terrorist violence in central Sulawesi and Maluku.

The Indonesian Attorney General's office initiated 17 new cases under the 2003 antiterrorism law and won convictions in all 17 trials.  Among the 17 convicted were Iwan Dharmawan Mutho (alias Rois) and Achmad Hasan (alias Purnomo), both sentenced to death for their roles in the Australian Embassy bombing, and Agung Abdul Hamid, who received life in prison for his role in the December 2002 McDonald's restaurant bombing in Makassar in southern Sulawesi.  In 2005, for the first time ever, convicted terrorists had their sentences increased upon appeal under the antiterrorism law, signaling a firmer law enforcement approach by judges.

In March, Indonesian courts sentenced JI Emir Abu Bakar Ba'asyir to 30 months in prison for his involvement in a "sinister conspiracy" to carry out the 2002 Bali attacks, but failed to convict him on any terrorism charges.  In August, the government granted Ba'asyir a 4 1/2-month sentence reduction for good behavior in a routine step in celebration of Indonesia's 60th anniversary of independence.  However, the government denied Ba'asyir an additional one-month sentence remission in November, traditionally given at the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.  In December, defense attorneys for Ba'asyir requested a judicial review of the case, citing new evidence as well as judicial error in the March conviction.  The new evidence behind the judicial review request centers on a written statement by convicted 2002 Bali bomber Amrozi that denies he requested and received Ba'asyir's approval for those attacks.

In September, Indonesia's Attorney General established a long-awaited terrorism and transnational crime task force designed to oversee counterterrorism trials nationwide through a cadre of special terrorism prosecutors, though he has yet to assign personnel to the new task force.  The United States agreed to provide $750,000 to help implement the creation of the task force.

Over the past year, the Indonesian Government continued to make progress toward developing an effective anti-money laundering regime, although more effort is needed in the areas of investigations, prosecutions, and bank and financial institution compliance.  The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) removed Indonesia from its Non-Complying Countries and Territories (NCCT) list on February 11.  Indonesian police have frozen terrorist financial assets uncovered during investigations, but the government's implementation of the sanctions regime established pursuant to UNSCR 1267 remains weak and is hampered by poor interagency coordination, as well as by human and technical capacity issues in both the government and financial institutions.  The USAID Financial Crimes Prevention Project is a multi-year effort that provides technical advisors and support to Indonesia's effort to develop an effective and credible anti-money laundering/counterterrorism finance (AML/CTF) regime.

Indonesian counterterrorism efforts remain hampered by weak rule of law, serious internal coordination problems, and systemic corruption that further limits already strained government resources.  Lawmakers and other senior elected officials continue their slow pace toward needed legal reforms that could strengthen the country's counterterrorism posture.  The much-anticipated establishment of an official counterterrorism coordinating agency and of an independent police commission to guide police reform awaits final presidential approval.  The government has not yet submitted a revision of the 2003 Counterterrorism Law to the House of Representatives.  Indonesian authorities recognize a need to revise the law to include updated standards for introducing evidence in terror cases, and to add comprehensive conspiracy articles to more effectively prosecute terrorism cases.

Japan

In 2005, Japan made valuable contributions to building counterterrorism capacity among Asian countries.  In September, it participated in a trilateral strategic dialogue on counterterrorism issues with the United States and Australia to better synchronize regional activities.  In July, Japan held a training course with the Government of Malaysia and the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism on prevention and crisis management of biological terrorism.  About 50 participants from ASEAN member countries, China, and South Korea attended the seminar.

In January, Japan introduced a voluntary Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) that tightens control on suspicious travelers to prevent terrorists' entry into Japan.

In October, the Japanese Diet extended for one year the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law that allows Japan’s Self-Defense Force (JSDF) to support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).  As of December 3, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) had provided approximately 7.3 million gallons of fuel to U.S. and allied naval vessels engaged in OEF in 2005.  In December, the Koizumi cabinet extended the Basic Plan for one year to allow continued JSDF reconstruction and humanitarian activities in Iraq.

In 2005, the Foreign Ministry granted long-term diplomatic status to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers working on the Container Security Initiative in Japan.  The Japanese Customs Bureau was reorganized to facilitate cooperation between Japanese CSI teams and U.S. CBP officers.  Japan formally accepted the U.S. air marshal program, and started its own air marshal program on flights to and from the United States.  After substantially rewriting its immigration legislation to improve enforcement capabilities, Japan agreed in principal to participate in the Immigration Advisory Program; coordination is ongoing.  Japan is an advocate and active participant in the International Port Security Program.  Widely considered a leader in the region in maritime security collaboration, the Government of Japan hosted a number of bilateral and multilateral maritime security events.  The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport's Maritime Bureau established the Port State Control Officer exchange program with the U.S. Coast Guard to share best practices in implementing international ship security requirements while boarding foreign flag ships in Japan.

The National Police Agency (NPA) and the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA) continued to monitor the activities of Aum Shinrikyo, renamed Aleph.  According to the PSIA, at the end of 2004 Aleph had about 650 live-in followers and about 1,000 other followers with 26 facilities in 17 prefectures.  The cult also has about 300 followers in Russia.  In May, the Tokyo police raided 22 facilities and arrested several Aleph members for working without a government license.  The PSIA continued surveillance of the group through 2005, and in November requested Public Security Commission permission to continue surveillance for three more years through January 2009.

The Tokyo District Court sentenced Haruo Wako, a former Japanese Red Army (JRA) member, to life in prison in March.  Wako and other members of the JRA are responsible for seizing the French Embassy in The Hague in 1974 and the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur in 1975.  Wako is appealing the sentence.  Prosecutors in September also asked for a life sentence for Fusako Shigenobu, the alleged mastermind of The Hague incident.

In June, the Diet (Parliament) amended Japanese immigration law to allow the sharing of information with foreign immigration officials.  The Immigration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice completed the implementing guidelines and is ready to commence detailed discussions on the logistics of sharing information.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also ready to move forward on the sharing of lost and stolen passport data.

Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea (ROK) boasts the third-largest troop presence in Iraq, demonstrates excellent law enforcement and intelligence capabilities, and provides terrorism-related training to law enforcement officials from various developing countries. Traditionally focused on potential terrorism from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, “North Korea,”) the ROK is slowly shifting its attention to possible acts of terror from beyond the Korean Peninsula, especially from al-Qaida and other groups that oppose the ROK's military presence in Iraq.

Seoul has supported U.S. goals in both Afghanistan and Iraq since 2003, despite political pressure from a skeptical Korean public.  One of the early contributors to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Republic of Korea maintains 3,200 troops in Iraq, making it the third-largest foreign troop contingent in Iraq; it also has committed $200 million in assistance to Iraq between 2004 and 2007.

The Republic of Korea has highly trained and capable intelligence and law enforcement agencies, as well as other government entities that monitor information on potential acts of terror and react in the event of a terrorist incident.  The ROK Government and public traditionally have focused on acts of terror by the DPRK but recently have begun to recognize terrorism as a global problem that could affect its citizens and interests beyond the Korean Peninsula.

The June 2004 murder of Korean citizen Kim Sun-il by Iraqi insurgents with al-Qaida ties was a critical wake-up call, because it was the first time that a ROK citizen had been targeted by an entity other than North Korea.  The incident galvanized both the government and National Assembly to push for comprehensive counterterrorism legislation.  The draft bills for the counterterrorism legislation have not yet passed the National Assembly; however, in March the ROK Government as an interim step revised its National Antiterror Action Directive (Presidential Directive 47). 

The ROK Customs Service began the Container Security Initiative program with the United States in the port city of Pusan in August 2003.  U.S. and ROK intelligence, defense, and law enforcement agencies worked together successfully to prevent the outbreak of any terrorist incidents during the November 2005 APEC Leaders Meeting, hosted by the ROK in Pusan.

The government consistently supported greater regional cooperation in combating terrorism in various international fora, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).  In recent years, the ROK has taken a leading role in joint counterterrorism projects with other members of the Asia-Pacific region.  It hosted the Third Conference on Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR III) in February, focusing on aviation and maritime security.  The government also dispatched expert speakers from the Korean National Police Agency to the Southeast Asia Regional Cooperation on Counterterrorism (SEARCCT) Cyber-terrorism Seminar, hosted in May by Malaysia.  In June, Seoul hosted a workshop on cybersecurity for the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).  The ROK and the Philippines co-chaired the Second ARF Seminar on Cyberterrorism, which was held in October in Manila.  The Korean National Police Agency and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) co-hosted a two-week training workshop in September, inviting 30 law enforcement officials from Russia and Southeast Asia to participate in training sessions on international cooperative investigation and cyber crime investigation.  They also invited 10 Thai law enforcement officials to a two-week forensic science program in November that provided training on responding to acts of terrorism.

In 2005, the government mandated through a revised National Antiterror Action Directive (Presidential Directive 47) the institutionalization of interagency committees on counterterrorism, including a ministerial-level standing committee, a weekly working group meeting, and a counterterrorism council chaired by the Prime Minister.  The directive also established a Terrorism Information Integration Center at the headquarters of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), with responsibility for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of potential intelligence on terrorist activities targeting ROK interests.

The Korean authorities increased their vigilance in the months following the June 2004 murder in Iraq of Kim Sun-il, reacting to threats from groups affiliated with al-Qaida to launch attacks in retaliation for Seoul's decision to dispatch additional troops to Iraq.  South Korea also increased security precautions in the months leading up to the November 2005 APEC Leaders Meeting in Pusan.  The government's stringent immigration policies and practices, and its generally homogeneous population, prevent the country from being a terrorist sanctuary.  Korean immigration and law enforcement agencies have an excellent record of tracking suspicious individuals entering their territory and react quickly to potential acts.

The Republic of Korea is a valued international partner in the fight against terror financing and other financial crimes such as money laundering, and it is pursuing international agreements in this regard.  The government hopes to sign an agreement with the United States to form a Financial Crime Enforcement Network to provide a more effective exchange of information on money laundering.  The National Assembly passed the Financial Transaction Reports Act, a major anti-money laundering law that mandates a currency transaction reporting system and enhanced due diligence requirements for financial institutions.

Laos

Although the Government of Laos has positive intentions regarding counterterrorism, weak enforcement procedures and inefficient security organizations hamper the implementation of multilateral agreements.  Border security is poor, and Laos unwittingly could be used as a safe haven for terrorists.  Since 2002, Laos

South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon (center) and his Lao counterpart Somsavat Lengsavad (right) sign a joint declaration to combat international terrorism during a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Vientiane in July, while Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda (left) serves as a witness.  (AFP Photo/Deshakalyan Chowdhury)
consistently has denounced international terrorism and expressed a willingness to cooperate with the international community on counterterrorism.  Its actions, however, have mostly been disappointing, due to both a lack of resources and skill and an attitude among Lao officials that Laos could not become a target of international terrorism.  In spite of the presence of a domestic insurgency that has employed terrorist tactics, such as ambushing civilian buses and bombing civilian targets, Lao officials at many levels see terrorism as an issue of only marginal relevance to Laos; they believe that Laos, as a small and neutral country, would not be targeted by international terrorists.

Laos experienced a handful of bombings conducted by suspected anti-government groups in 2005, but no injuries or deaths were reported.  The Bank of Laos vetted government and commercial bank holdings for possible terrorist assets, as identified by U.S.-provided lists of terrorist organizations and individuals, and has issued freeze orders for assets of organizations and individuals named on these lists.  However, the Bank has yet to take steps to report on its implementation of the provisions of UNSCR 1373 (Laos is late in submitting its third report to the CTC) or to require the freezing of assets of individuals and entities included on the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list.

At UN and U.S. request, Laos continued efforts to identify assets of terrorists and sponsors of terrorism.  The Bank of Lao issued freeze orders for assets of organizations and individuals named in lists provided by the United States.  Lao authorities issued orders limiting the amount of cash that can be withdrawn from local banks and strengthened reporting requirements of state and privately owned commercial banks.  Banking regulation remains extremely weak, however, and the banking system is vulnerable to money laundering and other illegal transactions.

Laos does not have a separate counterterrorism law.  The Lao judicial system, however, is prepared to prosecute acts of terrorism as serious crimes under the Lao criminal code, and recent amendments to the criminal code have strengthened counterterrorism sanctions.
 
Laos’ border security is weak; border officials cannot effectively control access to the country.  Since 9/11, Lao authorities have strengthened airport security, but security procedures at both airport and land immigration points remain lax compared with most other countries in the region.  In addition, official Lao identity documents, including passports and ID cards, can be purchased from corrupt officials.

There are no areas of the country where terrorists are relatively free to operate.  Laos does have a small insurgency numbering perhaps 1,000 to 2,000 persons, including women and children, that is based in very remote areas of the north.  Insurgents were responsible for a series of attacks against passenger vehicles along Route 13 in northern Laos in early 2003.  These attacks led to the deaths of approximately two dozen civilians.

Malaysia

Malaysian authorities have detained more than 110 suspected terrorists since May 2001 under the Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for detention without trial on renewable two-year terms.  According to public sources, Malaysia renewed 29 two-year detention orders for terrorist suspects, while nine such detainees were granted conditional release.  Malaysia has a bilateral extradition treaty with the United States and is in the process of negotiating a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT), both of which have the potential to aid in counterterrorism cooperation.

Malaysia facilitated regional counterterrorism training and cooperated in efforts to catch terror suspects.  The Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT), established in 2003 under Malaysia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, continued training Malaysian and regional authorities in law enforcement, banking, and other sectors.  Trainers from the United States, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Britain, France, Russia, and Canada participated in regional counterterrorism courses, lectures, and workshops.

Concerns remain over separatist violence in southern Thailand.  People along both sides of the porous border share Malay ethnicity and the Islamic faith, and their families and business interests often straddle the boundary.  While Malaysian tourists have been injured by bombings in southern Thailand, the violence has not spread across the border.

Mongolia

There are no known terrorist groups operating in Mongolia and no known bases of support.  However, government officials cite more than 6,000 kilometers of porous borders, easy entry for foreign travelers, and poverty as contributing conditions that could lead to terrorism within Mongolia.  The Government of Mongolia moved to increase awareness of the possibility of terrorism and to consider new laws.  In December, a law to combat money laundering and terrorist financing offenses was approved by the Cabinet for submission to the Parliament.

The Mongolian police, Ministry of Justice, and the General Intelligence Agency's counterterrorism branch all cooperated with the U.S. Embassy and willingly provided any requested support, most notably during the November visit to Mongolia by President and Mrs. Bush and Secretary of State Rice.  Due to resource and technical limitations, however, law enforcement capacities, including those related to counterterrorism, remain modest at best. 

Mongolia deployed a fifth rotation of 150 Mongolian soldiers to Iraq in September in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  In October, 13 Mongolian soldiers were deployed to Afghanistan, the country's fifth rotation in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

New Zealand

New Zealand further strengthened its domestic counterterrorism legislation in 2005.  In December 2004, the government introduced a bill into Parliament to extend until 2007 New Zealand's UN Security Council-related designations of terrorist organizations.  In June, Parliament passed the Terrorism Suppression Amendment Act 2005, which expanded criminalization of terrorist financing to include the intentional financing of non-designated organizations that engage in terrorism.  The amendment also extends until 2007 New Zealand's UN Security Council-related designations of terrorist organizations.  By year’s end, New Zealand had designated 420 terrorist organizations.  To date, no funds belonging to these organizations have been found in New Zealand. 

In April, Parliament passed the Charities Act, which established a Charities Commission to regulate and monitor charitable entities.  Charities will be obliged to register with the Commission in order to gain tax exempt status.  A charity will not be able to register if it is a designated terrorist entity or convicted of any offense under the Terrorism Suppression Act.

New Zealand continued cooperative efforts to enhance counterterrorism capacity both in the Pacific region and beyond.  It played a leading role organizing and funding through the Pacific Security Fund the first Pacific Islands Forum-wide counterterrorism contingency planning exercise, Exercise Ready Pasifika, which took place in Suva, Fiji, in November.  The exercise brought together senior counterterrorism officials from all Pacific Islands Forum countries to assess their capacity to plan for, and respond to, a developing terrorist incident.  Exercise Ready Pasifika focused on four specific themes:  internal cooperation and coordination, legal frameworks (with a particular focus on terrorist financing measures), border security (especially port and immigration security), and regional cooperation. 

In June, New Zealand hosted the inaugural Pacific Working Group on Counterterrorism (WGCT) in Auckland.  The Working Group brought together counterterrorism officials from Pacific Islands Forum member countries, Forum observer countries, and relevant regional organizations to discuss the region's priorities, challenges, and progress in implementing the international counterterrorism agenda.

New Zealand offered assistance to Pacific Islands Forum member countries to help them submit reports pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions 1267, 1373, and 1540.  Seven Pacific Island countries responded positively to this offer, and New Zealand assistance is being provided to them.

In June, New Zealand concluded a bilateral MOU on enhanced counterterrorism cooperation with Fiji.  New Zealand signed a Joint Declaration to Combat International Terrorism with ASEAN in July.  The New Zealand Police continued its relationship with the Indonesian National Police under a bilateral MOU on cooperation in countering terrorism.  The New Zealand Police provided practical assistance to Indonesia following the series of bomb attacks in Bali in October.

New Zealand has been a strong supporter of the Australia and Indonesia Interfaith Dialogue Initiative (IFD). 

Philippines

A boy walks past the wreckage of a bus charred during the February 14 bombing in Manila.  There were also terrorist attacks that day in Davao and General Santos City.  (AFP Photo/Joel Nito)
The major, and disturbing, trend in the Philippines has been the growing cooperation among the Islamist terrorist organizations operating in the country:  Jemaah Islamiya (JI); the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG); and the Rajah Sulaiman Movement (RSM).  The near-simultaneous Valentine's Day bombings in Manila, Davao, and General Santos City involved operatives from all three entities and resulted in eight deaths and 150 injuries. 

These bombings also used more technically sophisticated  explosive devices, another cause for concern.  The RSM, composed of Christian converts to Islam, has the ability to blend in and move freely about Luzon and other urban areas of the Philippines.  The Philippines experienced another domestic terrorist attack in August when a bomb exploded aboard the Dona Rosa passenger ferry in Basilan, injuring 30 people, four of whom subsequently died.

Philippine authorities had a number of successes against terrorists in 2005.  The government's most recent successes were the arrest in October of several members of the ASG-affiliated Rajah Sulaiman Movement, including RSM leader Ahmad Santos, and the arrest in December of RSM's alleged second-in-command and operations chief, Pio de Vera.  The Antiterrorism Task Force (ATTF) arrested, captured, or killed 83 suspected terrorists.  In March, it coordinated operations that led to the seizure of 600 kilos of ammonium nitrate and other bomb making materials stored in an apartment in Quezon City in the metropolitan Manila area.

Several terrorists were convicted in Philippine courts.  In June, a Philippine court convicted seven members of the Abu Sayyaf Group responsible for the Dos Palmas kidnapping, the Lamitan siege, the Golden Harvest massacre, and the Balobo massacre, which all took place in the Southern Philippines in 2001.  In October, a court convicted RSM operative Angelo Trinidad, JI operative Rohmat (aka Zaki), and ASG operative Gamal Baharan for their roles in the February 14 triple-city bombings.

Several key ASG figures were also killed during armed encounters with the Philippine armed forces.  Wedjimeh Sayad and Ahmad Sabudin, operatives serving under ASG sub-leader Jundam Jamalul, were killed in an encounter in Sulu on September 5.  Jainal Usman, a senior ASG lieutenant who was behind the abduction of six Malaysian resort workers in 2003, was killed in fighting in Tawi-Tawi on November 17 along with two subordinates, Faizal Mohammad and Pula Ali.

The Philippines made some progress in tracking, blocking, and seizing terrorist assets.  The main body tasked with investigating terrorist finance cases, the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), completed the first phase of its information technology upgrades in 2004.  From January to October 2005, AMLC received 1,760 suspicious transaction reports involving 8144 suspicious transactions, as well as covered transaction reports involving 44 million covered transactions.  Because of the significant improvements in the government’s anti-money laundering capacity and efforts, and the AMLC's accomplishments and efforts in addressing remaining vulnerabilities, the OECD's Financial Action Task Force removed the Philippines from the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories list in February.  Subsequently, AMLC was accepted as a member of the Egmont Group, a prominent body of financial intelligence units that fosters international cooperation.

The government continued to imprison Juanito Itaas, convicted by Philippine courts in connection with the 1989 murder of Colonel James Rowe, the deputy commander of the  Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group.  Donato Continente, also convicted as an accessory to the murder, was released in June after serving his full term.  Both Itaas and Continente were associated with the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) terrorist group at the time of the murder.

The absence of a law defining and codifying terrorist acts, combined with restrictions on gathering of evidence, continues to hinder the building of effective terrorism cases in the Philippines.  These problems include rampant corruption, low morale, inadequate salaries, recruitment and retention difficulties, lack of information technology upgrades, and lack of cooperation between police and prosecutors.

A large and growing case backlog and the absence of continuous trials for terrorism cases are major impediments to the Philippines' prosecution of suspected terrorists.  After four successive years of trying, the Philippines came closer to enacting new counterterrorism legislation in 2005.  A counterterrorism bill passed its second out of three readings in the House of Representatives in December.  The bill remains stalled in the Senate, which is seeking assurances that provisions of the legislation could not be used by the government against political opponents as well as against terrorists.

The Philippines issued arrest warrants for all Filipino nationals sought by the United States on terrorism charges.  The United States and the Philippines signed a bilateral extradition treaty in 1996.  The treaty gave precedence to the Philippine Government for the prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment of Filipino criminals apprehended in the Philippines.

Philippine military and law enforcement at the regional and provincial level worked closely with U.S. Embassy counterparts and visiting military personnel to ensure antiterrorism force protection to more than 25 annual U.S.-Philippine bilateral military events conducted throughout the country. 

The State Department is in the process of establishing an in-country Antiterrorism Assistance Program to improve the capability of government agencies to respond to terrorist threats.  The Australian-funded Bomb Data Center for the Philippine National Police also provided a new and important resource for investigating terrorist attacks.

U.S. and Philippine authorities worked closely to continue the Rewards for Justice programs targeting terrorist groups.  Using its Rewards Program, the USG made a number of payments ranging from $2,500 to $50,000 to informants who played critical roles in the capture of JI and ASG terrorists.  The U.S. Department of Defense also made two in-kind payouts under the rewards program in July, valued at $1,000 and $2,500, respectively.

Under USAID's multi-year LEAP (Livelihood Enhancement and Peace) program, 28,000 Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) combatants were successfully integrated into the economic mainstream. 

Border management in the Philippines struggles under the pressures of poor physical and information technology infrastructure, and insufficient capital and human resources.  Increased traffic and antiquated facilities overburden airports and seaports.  Understaffed customs and immigration offices, manned by undertrained and underpaid officials, are extremely vulnerable to corruption.  The United States has made some headway in assisting the Philippines in improving border management systems.

Despite plans dating back to 2001, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs has not yet introduced a digitized machine-readable passport.  However, the Philippine Government did complete a review process.

The Philippine government cooperated on regional counterterrorism efforts through its membership in APEC and in ASEAN.  The Philippines unanimously was elected chair of APEC's Counterterrorism Task Force in November 2004, and held this post throughout 2005.  At the Fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime in November, ASEAN nations, including the Philippines, called for the establishment of an ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism.

Singapore

During 2005, Singapore continued its intelligence and law enforcement cooperation with a variety of governments, including the United States, to investigate terrorist groups, especially Jemaah Islamiya (JI).  Singapore requested that Indonesia extradite several JI members to face trial for engaging in a conspiracy to commit terrorist acts in Singapore.

In 2005, Singapore detained three members of the regional terrorist group JI under the Internal Security Act (ISA).  As of November, 36 people with links to terrorist groups were in detention.  Detainees included members of JI who plotted to carry out attacks in Singapore in the past, and members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).  Under their orders of detention, the detainees were required to undergo a program of religious counseling with a group of volunteer religious counselors.  Singapore enlisted the support of religious teachers and scholars to provide counseling, study JI's ideology, and develop teachings to counter the group’s spread within Singapore's Muslim community.

In February, Singapore announced it would spend $23 million over three years to enhance computer security and combat cyberterrorism.  Singapore's Parliament amended the Moneychanging and Remittance Businesses Act in August to strengthen the government's ability to combat money laundering and terrorist finance-related activities in the moneychanging and remittance sector.

Singaporean officials have taken strong measures to enhance maritime security in nearby waters, especially the Strait of Malacca.  These measures are focused on addressing terrorist threats as well as piracy and other criminal attacks.  In August, Singapore hosted Exercise Deep Sabre, a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) maritime interdiction and port search exercise that was the first PSI exercise in Southeast Asia, with participants from 13 nations.  Singapore and the United States agreed in August to launch Operation Safe Commerce Singapore Phase Three, a program that evaluates vulnerabilities in maritime trade lanes that could allow entry of weapons of mass destruction, contraband, or illegal immigrants into U.S. ports.  In September, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia launched an "Eyes in the Sky" initiative, whereby the three nations will conduct combined maritime air patrols over the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

Singapore actively participated in counterterrorism efforts through various international fora, including the ASEAN Regional Forum.  In March, Singapore and the United States co-hosted an ASEAN Regional Forum confidence-building measure conference on maritime security.  In June, Singapore hosted the first Asia-Middle East Dialogue, with government and non-government representatives from 50 countries.  Senior Minister
Goh Chok Tong proposed the dialogue as a "platform for progressive Muslim voices."

Singapore Armed Forces commandos board a vessel during a simulated exercise off the Singapore Straits in March 2005.  (AFP Photo/MINDEF/HO)
Singapore Armed Forces commandos board a vessel during a simulated exercise off the Singapore Straits in March 2005.  (AFP Photo/MINDEF/HO)

Taiwan

In January, Taiwan established a cabinet-level Counterterrorism Office (CTO) to oversee and coordinate an interagency response to terrorist activities in Taiwan and in the region.  The CTO is comprised of representatives from ten agencies, including the National Security Bureau, the National Police Administration, the Department of Health, and the Atomic Energy Council.  Since its inauguration, the CTO has conducted two large-scale training exercises.  The first, held in April, tested responses to a terrorist attack against critical infrastructure as well as responses to a toxic spill, while the most recent exercise in December focused on chemical and biological threats.  The CTO's primary mission remains counterterrorism, but there are plans to broaden its focus by incorporating crisis management and disaster preparedness to create a new Ministry of Interior and Homeland Affairs in a proposed governmental reorganization.

In September, the Container Security Initiative began operations in Kaohsiung, identifying and targeting shipping containers that pose a terrorist risk.  Preliminary discussions are underway to expand the Initiative to the northern port of Keelung.  Taiwanese authorities expressed a willingness to join the U.S. Department of Energy's Megaports program to help restrict trafficking in radioactive materials.

Taiwan was elected to the Steering Committee of the Asia Pacific Group on money laundering.  Taiwan continued to provide rapid and thorough responses on terrorist finance issues and brought to U.S. attention a number of suspect transactions.  The Ministry of Justice drafted a new, detailed "Antiterrorist Action" law modeled after the U.S. Patriot Act.  The draft bill is being reviewed by the Executive Yuan.

Thailand

Thailand continues to support domestic and international counterterrorism efforts.  The country is a major beneficiary of U.S. antiterrorism assistance; numerous Thai police and security officials participated in U.S. Government training programs.

Thailand's biggest domestic security challenge is the ongoing insurgency in the far south of the country.  This region, bordering Malaysia, has experienced episodic separatist-related violence for decades.  Since January 2004, however, violence has increased dramatically and has continued throughout 2005.  There are no indications that transnational terrorist groups are directly involved in the violence, and there is no current evidence of direct operational links between southern Thai separatist groups and regional terror networks.  Overall, the Royal Thai Government maintains that the situation remains a domestic issue. 

Elements of the government expressed public concern, however, that militants involved in the violence may have received funding and training from outside Thailand.  Relations between Thailand and Malaysia were strained as the violence continued in Thai territory near their common border.  The ongoing unrest attracted increased international attention and the concern of international Islamic organizations.  In March, in response to the violence, the Indonesian-based Nahdlatul Ulama Islamic organization sent a delegation to Thailand.  In June, the Organization of Islamic Conferences sent a fact-finding delegation to study the underlying causes of the violence.

Police forensics and ballistics work often failed to produce evidence that led to arrests following insurgent attacks, and government prosecutors struggled to develop cases that could stand up in court.  In June, four southern Thai Muslims, accused of having links with Jemaah Islamiya (JI), were acquitted by a Bangkok court because of a lack of evidence. 

No current direct evidence exists that regional or transnational terror groups such as Jemaah Islamiya or al-Qaida are operating in Thailand.  Several Thai JI associates who provided financial and logistics support to JI fugitive leaders and operatives remain in Thailand.  Since Hambali's capture in 2003, there has been no indication that these Thai nationals had any form of contact with JI.  Thailand does not have any indigenous terrorist groups, but there are several militant domestic separatist groups implicated in the ongoing unrest in the far southern Muslim-majority provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani and in several districts of Songkhla Province.  These organizations include the Pattani United Liberation Organization, Barasi Revolusi Nasional, and Pattani Islamic Mujahedin Movement.

Some of these separatist groups may share the basic ideology and general rejection of Western influence held by international Islamic terrorists, but by all indications they  remain primarily focused on seeking autonomy or independence for the far southern provinces.  During 2005, separatist militants conducted attacks that included coordinated bombing attacks using improvised explosive devices (usually triggered with a cell phone), shootings, and beheadings.  There is no evidence that foreign governments provided financial, military, or diplomatic support for Thai separatist groups.

The U.S. and Thai militaries conducted a large number of joint exercises and training programs that supported counterterrorism objectives.  The United States and Thailand have undertaken a joint effort to create a national training facility that will provide field training for Thai military and police units involved in counterterrorism operations.  Bangkok's International Law Enforcement Academy is a center for law enforcement skills training that is useful to counterterrorism efforts.  Under the auspices of the Container Security Initiative, Thailand is engaged in a range of port security programs.  Thailand is working with its international partners to eliminate financial support networks for terrorists.

The government participated actively in international counterterrorism efforts, but areas of concern remain.  Thailand has not endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative, a key objective given Thailand's regional leadership role and strategic location.  Because Thailand is an international center for document fraud, the Thai Government has engaged with the G8 Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG) on increasing penalties for document fraud, but proposed legislation has not yet been passed.

Europe and Eurasia Overview
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“It is important . . . that those engaged in terrorism realize that our determination to defend our values and our way of life is greater than their determination to cause death and destruction to innocent people in a desire to impose extremism on the world.  It is our determination that they will never succeed in destroying what we hold dear in this country and in other civilized nations throughout the world.”
Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
BBC News
July 8, 2005
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Two terrorist attacks in London on July 7 and July 21 further focused European countries on the terrorist threat and prompted increased cooperation and efforts to strengthen counterterrorism capabilities.  The year was also marked by successes as terrorist networks were broken up by arrests in countries ranging from Denmark to Italy.  European nations continued to work in close partnership with the United States in the global counterterrorism campaign and continued to enhance their abilities, both individually and collectively, to deal with a terrorist threat increasingly seen as an internal one.  The contributions of European countries in sharing intelligence, arresting members of terrorist cells, and interdicting terrorist financing and logistics were vital elements in the war on terrorism. 

European Union (EU) member states remained strong and reliable partners.  International judicial cooperation advanced as EU members continued to enact and implement legislation for U.S.-EU Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties.  The United States and EU states developed more comprehensive, efficient border security processes to ensure close cooperation among law enforcement agencies and to improve information-sharing capabilities.  Progress has been slower as the United States and European Union worked through regular counterterrorism and terrorist financing engagements to develop mechanisms to implement the 2004 U.S.-EU Summit Declaration on Combating Terrorism.  A contributing factor has been member states' reluctance to grant more than token responsibilities to the EU counterterrorism coordinator's office or other Community institutions.  Following months of analyzing member states’ national counterterrorism systems, member state leaders agreed in December to revise the EU counterterrorism action plan, which is designed to disrupt terrorist networks and address conditions terrorists exploit to recruit new members, but does not have effective coordinating mechanisms at the EU level.  

European nations are active participants in a variety of multilateral organizations that contributed to counterterrorist efforts, including the G8, NATO, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).  The United States and its partners worked through all of these organizations to establish and implement best practices, build the counterterrorism capabilities of “weak but willing” states, and institutionalize the war against terrorism globally.  OSCE members committed themselves to becoming parties to the 13 UN terrorism conventions and protocols, to work together to modernize travel documents and shipping container security, and to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist organizations.  The OSCE held two workshops in 2005 on ICAO's minimum security standards for handling and issuance of passports, sponsored visits by ICAO and other experts to provide technical advice to requesting countries on new travel document security features, and increased OSCE countries' cooperation with Interpol in reporting lost or stolen passports.

Terrorist activity and the presence of terrorist support networks in Europe remains a source of concern.  Efforts to combat the threat in Europe were sometimes hampered by legal protections that made it difficult to take firm judicial action against suspected terrorists, asylum laws that afforded loopholes, inadequate legislation, or standards of evidence that limited the use of classified information in holding terrorist suspects.  The new EU arrest warrant encountered legal difficulties in some countries that forbid extradition of their own citizens.  Germany found it difficult to convict members of the Hamburg cell of suspected terrorists allegedly linked to the September 11 attacks.  Terrorists are also able to take advantage of ease of travel within Schengen visa countries.  Some European states have at times not been able to prosecute successfully or hold some of the suspected terrorists brought before their courts.  The EU as a whole remains reluctant to take steps to block the assets of charities associated with HAMAS and Hizballah. 

On July 7, four suicide bombers --  all British citizens -- detonated themselves on three London subway trains and one bus, killing 56 persons and injuring more than 700.  Two weeks later, another group of terrorists tried unsuccessfully to set off bombs in the London Underground.  The attacks in London prompted the British Government to seek tougher counterterrorism legislation that would allow for proscribing groups and individuals glorifying or inciting terrorism.  

In July, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) declared an end to its decades-long armed struggle.  In September, an independent commission on decommissioning announced that PIRA had put all its weapons "beyond use."

Concerned about the implication of the London attacks for homegrown terrorism in Europe, countries across the continent moved to enact legislation to strengthen their counterterrorism capabilities and to crack down on resident terrorist suspects.

Italy continued to arrest and deport terrorist suspects throughout the year; after the London bombings, it passed legislation to increase the government’s ability to expel extremists. 

In September, the Spanish High Court sent al-Qaida cell leader Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas and 17 members of his cell to prison for terms ranging from six to 27 years for membership in a terrorist organization and conspiracy to commit terrorist acts.

In October, 200 to 300 gunmen attacked police and military facilities in the city of Nalchik in the north Caucasus region of Russia, killing dozens before the authorities re-established control.

Members of Russian special armed forces storm a shop in the southern city of Nalchik on October 14, where gunmen were hiding following a deadly rampage the previous day.  (AFP Photo/Maxim Marmur)
Cooperation among European law enforcement Agencies was important to counterterrorism successes.  In the first use of the EU arrest warrant for terrorism, French authorities in February extradited a senior ETA suspect to Spain.  In April, Switzerland extradited  to Spain the alleged leader of a 2004 conspiracy to bomb Spain's High Court and other Madrid landmarks.

In November, the United States and the OSCE hosted a conference on combating terrorist finance for counterterrorism officials from the 55 member states.  The seventh in a series designed to disseminate best practices and build capacity in Europe and Eurasia, the conference struck a balance between policy (building political commitment and implementing international legal obligations) and technical support (how to build a financial intelligence unit and how to prosecute terrorist financing cases).

Uzbekistan’s support for the global war on terror has eroded significantly due to the downturn in U.S.-Uzbek relations.  While Uzbek authorities continued to stress the importance of counterterrorism cooperation, the government limited its participation in U.S. Government-sponsored counterterrorism programs, and in July terminated an agreement allowing U.S. access to the Karshi-Khanabad airbase.  The Uzbek Government increased security forces to prevent terrorist attacks, but failed to address the conditions terrorists exploit to gain popular support and recruits for their cause.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has played a key role in combating terrorism at the regional level in Europe.  First and foremost, NATO continues Operation Active Endeavor (OAE), a naval operation that aims to combat terrorism by monitoring maritime traffic in the Mediterranean.  Thus far, NATO forces have monitored more than 75,000 vessels, boarding some 100 suspect ships.  In addition, over 480 ships have taken advantage of NATO escorts.

Albania

The Albanian Government continued its efforts to improve its law enforcement and border control security by participating in U.S. Government-sponsored training and technical assistance programs.  The Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) continued to implement the Total Information Management System (TIMS).  In 2005, TIMS was expanded to cover all ten of Albania's major border crossings with its four neighboring countries (Italy, Greece, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro) and Kosovo.  During the first nine months of 2005, the system helped officials detain 145 wanted persons. 

Albania continued to implement provisions of anti-money laundering legislation, with a focus on curtailing the activities of organizations suspected of having links to identified terrorist organizations.  Although progress was made in this area, the effectiveness of the government's counterterrorist efforts were hampered by inadequate financial resources, corruption, a lack of fully trained officers responsible for borders and ports, and poor communications and data processing infrastructure.

The International Maritime Organization and U.S. Coast Guard have determined that Albania adequately reported required information and maintained adequate counterterrorism measures for port security and complied with the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS).

The government continued to implement its Terrorism Financing Freeze (TFF) law enacted in 2004.  Since December 2004, the Albanian Government has frozen the assets of four organizations (Taibah, International Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, Al Haramein, and Global Relief Foundation) and four individuals (Nabil Abdul Saydi, Patricia Rosa Vinck, Yasin Al-Kadi, and Abdul Latif Saleh), all identified by the United Nations as suspected of supporting or funding extremist groups or organizations. 

Albania is committed to maintaining its presence in Iraq as long as required.  In Afghanistan, Albania deployed 26 troops to ISAF, including four new members of a joint medical unit.

Armenia

With substantial U.S. assistance, Armenia continues to strengthen its capacity to counter the country's few perceived terrorist threats.  While no known terrorist groups operate domestically, Armenia's geographic location, porous borders, and loose visa regime present growing opportunities for traffickers of illicit materials, persons, and finances. 

The government's deepening political and economic ties with neighboring Iran have, however, limited Armenian criticism of Iranian extremism and heralded closer diplomatic relations between the two countries.  Armenia also has normal diplomatic and economic relations with Syria.  Both Iran and Syria have large ethnic Armenian populations.

In February, the government established the Financial Monitoring Center (FMC), a U.S.-supported financial intelligence unit within the Central Bank that is designed to consolidate reporting requirements for large or otherwise suspicious money transfers.  The FMC, established by legislation passed in late 2004, complements new laws that impose financial reporting requirements designed to reduce money laundering and limit terrorist access to financing.  There were no reported incidents involving the transfer of funds in support of terrorism in Armenia, but the heavy flow of remittances suggests that this would be difficult to detect.  The FMC, still in its infancy, is not yet an effective investigatory agency.  It spent most of the year testing reporting requirements, developing forms and instructions, and training bank regulators, examiners, and financial analysts. 

Armenia continued efforts to increase the security of its vital documents such as birth certificates, introduced additional security features into the production of passports, and began installing passport readers at border posts.  The National Security Service and police continued to share information with the U.S. Embassy when they discovered fraudulent U.S. visas or other documents.

On August 17, the government passed legislation establishing the National Control List, a schedule of controlled commodities that either cannot be exported or that require an export license because of the potential for misuse.  The Armenian National Control List is adapted from the European Union's dual-use list.  It complements legislation the government adopted in late 2004 that required licensing exports and imports of radioactive sources. 

Armenia supported U.S. efforts in Iraq with troops on the ground and provided overflight authorization in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Austria

Austria has made efforts to tighten controls on suspected terrorism financing and fulfilled its obligations to asset freeze decisions pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions and EU Clearinghouse designations.  However, it failed to initiate any freezing actions independently.  Austria's legal and institutional framework include comprehensive money laundering and terrorist financing legislation consistent with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations.

Through November, the Austrian Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and the Federal Agency for State Protection and Counterterrorism (BVT) received 24 reports on suspected terrorism financing transactions.  This was a significant increase over 2004, and was largely due to improved banking control mechanisms and better international cooperation.

A legislative package introduced in July earmarked 105 million euros for terrorism prevention measures and related research through the year 2013; five million euros were earmarked for the year 2005.

Austria amended its immigration laws to have more restrictive legal tools against foreign visa holders suspected of terrorist links and extremist preaching and incitement.  Austria began an investigation into potential terrorist recruitment in prisons and refugee camps, a concern that followed a 2004 surge of Chechen asylum seekers.
 
In the wake of the London bombings, the Interior Ministry's intelligence arm, the Federal Agency for State Protection and Counterterrorism (BVT), stepped up surveillance of suspected Islamic extremists.  The BVT singled out a handful of suspected extremist mosques in Vienna for increased monitoring.  It continued surveillance of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement and of suspected Afghan extremists entering Austria as asylum seekers.

Austria maintained four police instructors at the Iraqi Police Academy in Jordan to help train Iraqi police.  In Afghanistan, Austria temporarily deployed 93 soldiers to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help provide security for the September elections.  Additionally, Austria committed four liaison officers to the ISAF headquarters in Kabul and two advisors to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

Together with the United States and the EU, Austria operated two counterterrorism-related training programs for countries in Central Asia:  the Central Asian Border Initiative (CABSI) and the Vienna Central Asia Initiative (VICA).

Austria pledged a total of US $1 million for the period between 2002 and 2006 to the UN program to combat terrorism.  It is a major donor country to the United Nations’ Vienna-based counterterrorism and anti-drug office, the UN Drug Control Program (UNDCP).

Azerbaijan

Since 2001, Azerbaijan has aggressively apprehended and tried members of suspected terrorist groups and closed Islamic organizations operating in Azerbaijan that are suspected of supporting terrorist groups.  Azerbaijan has taken steps to combat terrorist financing and identified possible terrorist-related funding by distributing lists of suspected terrorist groups and individuals to local banks.  In 2003, the government established an inter-ministerial experts group responsible for drafting anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance legislation.  In December, an experts group, led by the National Bank of Azerbaijan, finalized its proposed anti-money laundering legislation to include establishment of a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and expansion of the predicate crimes for money laundering beyond narcotics trafficking. 

In February, the Azerbaijani Court of Grave Offenses convicted a group of six men that called themselves "al-Qaida Caucasus" for planning terrorist attacks in Baku.  The group was found with TNT, hand grenades, other armaments, and propaganda materials; it attempted to recruit female suicide bombers.  Members of the group received sentences ranging from three to 14 years.  In July, the Azerbaijani Ministry of National Security arrested a group of armed Islamic extremists and confiscated a large quantity of explosives, chemicals, and plans for the production of explosive devices.  In December, the government extradited two members of the Kongra-Gel/PKK to Turkey.
Azerbaijan served as a conduit for individuals with ties to terrorist organizations seeking to move men, money, and material throughout the region.  Accordingly, Azerbaijan stepped up its interdiction efforts and had some success reducing terrorist transit.

Azerbaijan granted blanket overflight clearance, engaged in information sharing and law enforcement cooperation, and approved numerous landings and refueling operations at its civilian airport in support of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan.

Since August 2003, Azerbaijan has supported the Coalition effort in Iraq with an infantry company of 151 soldiers stationed at the Haditha dam.  Since November 2002, a platoon of Azerbaijani soldiers has worked with the Turkish peacekeeping contingent in Afghanistan. 

Belgium

Overall awareness of the terrorist threat to Belgium increased this past year, partly in reaction to the London bombings, but also in response to home-grown threats to Belgian security.  The London bombings intensified Belgium's continuing effort to improve cooperation with foreign security agencies.  Belgian police continue to work directly with such agencies both in neighboring and more distant countries.  In addition to long-standing arrangements with police in Germany, France, and the other two Benelux nations, Belgium now has cooperation agreements with Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom.  Cooperation with the United States also continued to improve under the efforts of Belgian Interior Minister Dewael.  Belgian authorities stressed the need for more information sharing in order to move legally against suspected terrorists. 
President George W. Bush during a news conference following a NATO Summit in February in Brussels.  (AFP Photo/Benoit Doppagne)

Consequently, the government was active on a number of fronts, including enforcement, internal coordination, development of legislation, and consequence management.  Belgian authorities responded more aggressively to activities inside the country’s borders with investigations, raids, arrests, and use of new counterterrorism legislation.  Prosecutors are also seeking lengthier sentences in ongoing trials under the counterterrorism law. 

Belgium is an active partner in the Department of Homeland Security’s Container Security Initiative for the ports of Antwerp and Zeebrugge, and on port security in general.   

Belgian authorities remained concerned about potential terrorist activities by groups from Algeria and North Africa.  The government targeted investigations against the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), and a nebulous Islamic extremist network operating out of several provinces, including Charleroi, that is suspected of connections with the November 9 suicide attack in Iraq by a Belgian woman.  Two leading Kongra-Gel (KGK)-affiliated media production studios, BRD Corporation Media Production Company and Roj-NV, are co-located in Belgium.

On November 9, Belgium began the trial of 13 defendants linked to the GICM, using for the first time its 2003 counterterrorism law criminalizing terrorist acts and membership in terrorist groups.  The trial, expected to last several months, is the result of arrests made in 2004 by Belgian counterterrorism police.  This series of raids throughout Belgium dismantled a network that is believed to have supported the 2004 bombings in Casablanca and Madrid and that also is suspected of attempting to recruit fighters to support attacks against American interests in Iraq. 

Belgian judicial authorities continued prosecution of a case against 11 DHKP/C members  charged with belonging to a criminal organization, arms possession, forgery, and use of forged documents.  Turkish authorities alleged that one of the suspects, Fehriye Erdal, was involved in the 1996 murder of Ozdemir Sabanci, an influential business executive in Turkey.  The chairman and the secretary of the then-DHKP/C headquarters in Belgium were charged under the 2003 counterterrorism legislation with belonging to a terrorist organization.

On November 30, Belgian federal police made 14 additional arrests on terrorism charges in the aftermath of a November 9 suicide attack by a Belgian woman against American forces in Iraq.  Police conducted numerous searches in Brussels, Charleroi, Tongeren, and Antwerp, and seized large quantities of documents, computers, and other material.  Six of those arrested were held and charged under the 2003 counterterrorism legislation for providing support to a terrorist organization. 

Belgian authorities alleged that those arrested in connection with the attack in Iraq were using Belgium as a platform for recruiting and transporting volunteer fighters to Iraq.  According to Federal Prosecutor Daniel Bernard, the suicide attack inside Iraq prompted authorities to speed up what had been an investigation lasting more than four months and involving several Belgian and foreign security services.  Public awareness of the presence of terrorist-affiliated support networks on Belgian soil has grown.  The Belgian Government has moved energetically against these networks, including the investigation and prosecution noted above.  It also has disrupted untraced money flows through such alternative remittance systems as phone shops.

Belgium continued to respond fully to EU and UN Security Council actions to freeze suspected terrorist assets.  The burden of proof on judges is relatively high, however.  In order to constitute a criminal offense, authorities must demonstrate that the support was given with the knowledge that it would contribute to the commission of a crime by the terrorist group.  Further, an FATF mutual evaluation found that Belgian law was out of compliance with FATF standards on asset freezing and does not establish a national capacity for designating foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs).  Belgian authorities must demonstrate in each case that the group given support actually constitutes a terrorist group.

Belgium's greatest contribution in military terms to the global war on terror was to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, with a troop presence of 300 in 2005.  Belgium planned to expand its technical assistance efforts in Iraq, and began implementing Iraqi debt forgiveness within the framework of Paris Club agreements. 

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) counterterrorism cooperation with the United States on the law enforcement side was good, within the limits of its current institutional capacity. Bosnia remains a weak state, however, with multiple semi-autonomous centers of power.  It therefore could present an attractive environment for those seeking a locale to facilitate terrorist activities.

Under new amendments, an interagency Citizenship Review Commission was able to strip BiH citizenship from naturalized citizens who fraudulently obtained their citizenship, have no substantial ties to Bosnia at present, or obtained their citizenship because of government error or misconduct.  These changes corrected defects in the 1997 Law on Citizenship that hindered previous efforts to strip the citizenship of such individuals, and now enables Bosnia to deport them.  The commission reviews the citizenship status of mujahedin fighters and withdraws citizenship, where appropriate, on a case-by-case basis.  The legislation instructs the Citizenship Review Commission to complete its work within two years. 

In October, Federation police and law enforcement authorities raided a safe house in a suburb of Sarajevo and arrested two terrorist suspects with links to terrorist networks in Western Europe.  The police confiscated weapons and explosive material.  Pursuant to the ongoing investigation, police arrested in late November both the person who supplied the explosives and two other individuals who served as the conduit between the supplier and the recipients.  The investigation is ongoing, and cooperation with U.S. and other foreign law enforcement agencies remains excellent.

Although there are specific counterterrorism laws in the Criminal Procedure Code, prosecutors found it difficult to link illegal activities to specific terrorism charges.  Terrorist-related cases proceeded under conventional criminal statutes, such as illegal arms possession, arms smuggling, and conspiracy, which all carry fairly light penalties by American standards.  Prosecutions were conducted under counterterrorism statutes in 2005.

In September, the Sarajevo Cantonal Prosecutor’s Office dropped terrorism charges against six former Federation officials suspected of cooperating with Iran to operate a terrorist training camp in Bosnia.  Although the statute of limitations on the terrorism charges ran out, the trial is proceeding under charges of conspiracy to commit attempted murder.  In October, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) hard-liner Hasan Cengic, a Bosniak, was acquitted of charges that he facilitated arms trading and arms production during the 1992-95 war.  Cengic is known for his hard-line role within the SDA and for his continued business association with foreign extremist groups.  In September, in cooperation with the Regional Security Officer at the American Embassy in Sarajevo, police apprehended a man who had phoned in a bomb threat to the Embassy.  In December, the man pleaded guilty to endangering internationally protected persons, which is not a terrorism charge.

Six new state-level institutions with counterterrorism responsibilities have been developed since 2000.  Some of these are operational, while others remained nascent, with more authority on paper than actual capacity.  The six are:
 
· The State Border Service (SBS);
· The State Investigative and Protection Agency (SIPA);
· The Ministry of Security (MoS);
· The BiH State Court and State Prosecutor's Office;
· The Foreign Affairs Service (FAS); and
· The Bosnian State Intelligence and Security Agency (OSA). 

The State Border Service was the most fully operational.  It is responsible for controlling the country's four international airports and 55 international border crossings that are spread across 1,551 kilometers.  The SBS is considered one of the better border services in Southeast Europe and is one of the few truly multiethnic institutions in Bosnia.  However, a number of illegal crossing points remain that the SBS does not control, including dirt paths and river fords.  Many official checkpoints remain understaffed.

In February, Bosnian authorities from the State, the Republika Srpska, the Federation, and the Brcko District agreed to form a single joint registry of all NGOs and associations in Bosnia.  All parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding to create a single registry database at the Ministry of Justice.  The government remained vigilant against previously shut NGOs renewing their activities.  Authorities continued to investigate other organizations, private companies, and individuals for links to terrorist financing.

Aktivna Islamska Omladina (Active Islamic Youth, or AIO) is a Bosnian-bred non-governmental organization whose stated goal is to establish an Islamic state in Bosnia and Herzegovina based on a fundamentalist interpretation of the Koran.  Individuals with ties to the so-called "El Mujahid Brigade," a wartime unit comprised mainly of foreign extremists, founded AIO in the city of Zenica in 1995.  The group advocates religious intolerance and openly labels Christianity and Judaism enemies of Islam.  Its activists teach young Bosniaks a strict literal form of Islam under the guise of operating youth centers, summer camps, Internet cafes, and other outreach activities.  AIO has branch offices throughout Bosnia, and a growing presence of active members in Western Europe and the United States.  AIO sponsors SAFF magazine, a weekly print and on-line publication notable for its anti-Semitic and anti-Western rhetoric, interviews, and exposes.  Although not circulated widely, SAFF is the AIO’s most important instrument in spreading its message to the Bosniak population.

Bosnia and Herzegovina sent a 36-member explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) unit to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom; this unit began its second rotation in Iraq in November. 

Bulgaria

Bulgarian responses to terrorism included numerous official public statements, efforts to assist with international terrorism investigations, and participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.  Bulgaria's support consisted of 75 military personnel, including staff officers, a mechanized infantry platoon, and military instructors.  In addition, one Bulgarian battalion with 386 personnel served in Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

The Financial Intelligence Agency (FIA) was charged with inspecting financial institutions and investigating transactions valued at or above 30,000 Bulgarian lev (approximately U.S.$ 18,750).  It remained vigilant against terrorist financing and continued to cooperate with the U.S. Government in identifying terrorist assets.  The FIA distributed lists of individuals and organizations linked to terrorism to all banks in Bulgaria, the Ministry of Interior, Customs, and the Border Police.  The FIA coordinated information received on searches for persons and entities named in Executive Order 13224 lists.  It also provided feedback, including information on the response level of Bulgarian banks, to the U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN), as well as to the U.S. Embassy.  In addition, the FIA provided statistics to the United States on suspicious transactions that were referred to the Prosecutor General for further action.

In February, Bulgarian security services and their Irish counterparts uncovered a plan by individuals reportedly linked to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to move money through a Bulgarian bank, allegedly for money laundering purposes.

Croatia

Croatia backed up its stated commitment to the global war on terror with concrete contributions.  It deployed to Afghanistan the sixth rotation of a 50-person military contingent, attached to the ISAF, that included 43 Military Police personnel assigned to a multinational MP company.  In addition, Croatia deployed a three-person team of one diplomat and two civilian police to the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Feyzabad, and a four-person team to a combined medical unit. 

Cyprus

Cyprus generally supported international efforts to block and freeze terrorist assets, implemented Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations, and conformed to EU directives on counterterrorism.  The Cypriot Government drafted legislation to restructure, modernize, and strengthen Cyprus' Central Intelligence Service (KYP) for the first time since the Republic was founded. 

Cyprus’ legal framework for investigating and prosecuting terrorist-related activity remained weak.  There was some debate about possible amendments to the Cypriot constitution, but no political consensus has yet developed. 

Although Cypriot law enforcement and intelligence services were generally cooperative on counterterrorism, legal and constitutional restrictions made it difficult for Cyprus to investigate and prosecute terrorism-related activities effectively.  A recent change to evidentiary law allows the introduction of hearsay evidence in court proceedings, but information obtained through wiretaps and direct surveillance is prohibited.  Further changes to strengthen the laws of evidence would make a real difference, but this likely would require amending the constitution.  Meanwhile, Cyprus is working on a number of laws that could strengthen counterterrorism capabilities.  These include new legislation aimed at modernizing and restructuring the Cypriot Central Intelligence Service (KYP) and a new law on arms brokering intended to bring Cypriot practices in line with an EU common position. 

In July, the Government of Cyprus and the United States signed a ship boarding agreement under the auspices of the Proliferation Security Initiative.  The Cypriot Parliament ratified the agreement in November.  This was the United States’ first such agreement with an EU member state.  With the world's ninth largest commercial fleet, Cyprus is a strong ally in U.S. efforts to regulate international maritime traffic to reduce the risk of both WMD proliferation and terrorism.  Cypriot Government officials made significant improvements to Cyprus' offshore industry regulation as a result of efforts to bring Cypriot law and practice into accordance with EU requirements.  Cyprus was also an advocate for the completion of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) and followed the EU position on the text. 

The United States and Cyprus cooperated closely on issues related to terrorist finance and money laundering.  The U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the Cypriot Financial Intelligence Unit (MOKAS) signed a Memorandum of Understanding designed to formalize and enhance their historically excellent relations.

Although Cyprus established an effective legal framework with regard to export controls -- with Cyprus Customs as the lead enforcement entity -- it did not establish a cohesive export control system.  Police and customs officers need additional training in areas of basic inspection, equipment utilization, and familiarization.

 “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,”

The United States does not recognize the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” nor does any other country except Turkey.  That entity cannot sign treaties, international conventions and protocols, or other international agreements.  Moreover, the area administered by Turkish Cypriots lacked the legal and institutional framework necessary to combat money laundering and terrorist financing effectively.  Within these limitations, authorities in the Turkish Cypriot-controlled north cooperated with the United States in pursuing specific counterterrorism-related objectives. 

The “Green Line” between northern and southern Cyprus is relatively porous.  Turkish Cypriot authorities recently adopted new "legislation" strengthening controls against illegal immigration and tightening "citizenship" requirements.  The large Turkish troop presence in the north acted as a deterrent to open Kongra-Gel/PKK activity.   

In the north, Turkish Cypriot authorities lacked the legal and institutional framework to meet minimum international standards on combating money laundering and terrorist finance.  Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriot community took some steps to prevent terrorist financing within its banking institutions.  The Turkish Cypriot "Central Bank," for example, regularly asked financial institutions to search for any assets linked to individuals or entities designated as terrorists by the United States and/or the UN 1267 Committee.  Turkish Cypriot authorities also committed to prepare and implement new legislation to prevent money laundering and improve oversight of casinos, offshore banks, and currency exchange points.

Czech Republic

Whether providing military assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan or assisting the United States in routine investigations, the Czech Republic proved itself a reliable partner in preventing possible terrorist activity.
 
In October, the Czech Parliament ratified the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.  This action marked the final step in providing the Czech Government the appropriate legal, regulatory, and statutory mechanisms to combat terrorist financiers more effectively.

Pursuant to a U.S. arrest warrant and INTERPOL Red Notice, Czech authorities in December arrested Oussama Kassir, a Lebanese-born Swedish national, while he was in transit from Stockholm to Lebanon.  Kassir was wanted in the United States on allegations that he had conspired to provide material support to terrorists in the planned establishment of a terroristi training camp in Bly, Oregon.  At the end of 2005, Kassir remained in Czech custody pending extradition to the United States. 

Denmark

Acting under provisions of its 2002 counterterrorism law, Danish authorities made several arrests on terrorism-related charges.  In the fall, Danish police arrested seven persons on suspicion of planning a suicide attack in Europe.  At year's end, Danish prosecutors were still holding and considering whether to press charges against five of the detainees.  The Danish Government's actions were related to the Bosnian police's arrests of a Swede and a Danish citizen of Turkish origin.  Both were accused of possessing a significant quantity of explosives.

In September, Danish police also arrested Said Mansour, a Danish citizen originally from Morocco, on charges of distributing terrorist recruiting materials.  At year's end, police were also reportedly investigating possible links between Mansour and the five persons still detained on suspicion of planning a suicide attack in Europe.  He remained in police custody at the end of the year, pending trial.  Mansour previously served a 90-day sentence from December 2004 on weapons possession charges.

Danish prosecutors pressed charges against the Danish NGO "Revolt" (Opror) after the group's spokesman, Patrick MacManus, informed local media that the group had raised and transferred funds to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).  In December, the Danish Justice Minister announced that Danish prosecutors would press charges against the Danish chapter of al-Aqsa for raising funds for HAMAS.

The Danish Government cooperated with regional and international terrorist fora.  Within the European Union, it implemented the designation of terrorist organizations through its obligations under the EU's terrorism finance, UNSCR 1267, and Clearinghouse mechanisms.  Denmark continued to deploy more than 500 military personnel in southern Iraq to assist with security and reconstruction efforts, and contributed more than 170 military personnel to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.  Denmark also chaired the UN Security Council's Counterterrorism Committee in 2005. 

Estonia

Numerous Estonian police, security, rescue, and emergency response agencies participated in a large U.S.-funded (International Counterproliferation Program) two-week counterterrorism/non-proliferation exercise from October 27 to November 4.  The exercise was showcased to representatives and observers from Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, France, Britain, and Sweden.

Estonia contributed explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan operating in Kabul.  In December, Parliament renewed the Afghanistan troop mandate for up to two years and increased the limit on Estonian participation by 150 troops to support a UK-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in southern Afghanistan.  In Iraq, the Estonian infantry platoon ESTPLA-11 was stationed in Baghdad under the command of the 1st Armored Division of the U.S. Army.  In December, Parliament renewed the mandate of Estonian troops in Iraq for 12 months.  Estonia contributed to the NATO training mission in Iraq, donated 50,000 euros to the NATO Iraq Fund, and had two constitutional experts on call to support the drafting of Iraq’s constitution. 

Finland

Finland remained strongly committed to Afghan reconstruction; the government aimed to provide 10 million euros in development and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan on an annual basis.  Approximately 100 Finnish troops were deployed in Afghanistan in support of ongoing ISAF operations, and a number of Finnish civilian crisis management experts were working in Afghanistan as well. 

Interior Minister Rajamaki visited Washington in July for discussions with Justice and Homeland Security officials, and other Finnish officials participated in training courses in the United States.  Finland actively supported and took part in European Union counterterrorism efforts, and participated in a number of EU and OSCE-sponsored events. 

New regulations entered into force on October 1, requiring ships to submit security-related information prior to entry into port.  Finland signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) with the United States in late 2004.  The treaty is awaiting ratification by the Finnish Parliament. 

Finnish security police maintained a dedicated counterterrorism unit.  Finland has national authority to freeze terrorist assets.  The Money Laundering Clearinghouse performed investigations on all individuals suspected of financing terrorist acts, including all individuals and entities on the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list.  In the event that such assets are identified, they can be immediately frozen while a criminal investigation occurs either in Finland or abroad. 

In cases when another government presented a legal request for action or when an individual or organization was suspected of having committed an offense within Finland's borders, Finland implemented regulations that allowed it to freeze assets without EU or UN approval.  Finland amended its criminal code to make it possible to sentence leaders of terrorist groups to 15 years in jail, although the group has to have actually committed an act of terrorism in Finland before investigation or prosecution can begin.  If the charge includes murder, the maximum sentence is life imprisonment. 

France

France continued to uncover and dismantle terror networks present on its soil, including several that recruited terrorists to Iraq.  Following the London bombings, French officials worked closely with their British counterparts.  Perceiving a number of deficiencies in their counterterrorism capabilities, France proposed legislation to remedy these deficiencies.  Since March, the French Government has been drafting a white book on terrorism. 

At the political and diplomatic level, France continued its engagement within the UNSC Counterterrorism Committee and the G8’s Counterterrorism Action Group.  On the military front, its Special Forces participated in counterterrorist operations in Afghanistan and as a part of Task Force 150, a multinational naval force that patrolled the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to interdict the movement of suspected terrorists between Afghanistan and the Arabian Peninsula.  In Afghanistan, French Mirage-2000 fighters flew with USAF fighters to assist American and Afghan ground troops. 

France continued to develop the competencies and capabilities of TRACFIN, the Ministry of Finance’s terrorism financing coordination and investigation unit.  Within the European Union, France played an active role in the Clearinghouse, the EU process for designating terrorist organizations under UNSCR 1373.  France has not designated HAMAS-affiliated charities, such as the French-based Comite de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens, arguing that they have no proven links to terrorism.  France also opposed EU designation of Lebanese Hizballah as a terrorist organization, although it supported Hizballah's eventual disarmament, which it maintained would result in Hizballah’s gradual integration into Lebanese politics.

France cooperated closely with the United States in pressing for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559.  This resolution reaffirmed a call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanon; it also called for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.

French and Spanish authorities jointly made significant progress in combating Basque separatist groups, including Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA).  In the first use of the EU arrest warrant for terrorism, French authorities extradited ETA suspect Unai Berrosteguieta Eguiara to Spain on February 18.

The counterterrorism section of the Paris prosecutor’s office usually led the French Government’s terrorism investigations.  Investigative judges, who in the French system combine prosecutorial and judicial powers, concentrated on Islamic/international terrorism, Basque/ETA terrorism, and terrorism linked to Corsican separatist groups.  Their mandate was extensive and included terrorist acts on French soil and acts abroad that affected French citizens.  In March, then-Justice Minister Dominique Perben announced the hiring of four additional judges to investigate terrorism, along with additional support staff, bringing the number of specialized terrorism investigation judges to nine.

The government continued its policy of expulsion for non-French citizens engaged in activities that promoted hate.  Interior Minister Sarkozy announced October 4 that 19 Islamic extremists had been expelled from France since the beginning of the year; 102 have been expelled since 2002.  In March, the CSA, France’s equivalent of the FCC, ordered the Eutelsat satellite company to cease transmitting Sahar 1, an Iranian television station, because of its anti-Semitic and hate-filled broadcasting.  Following the CSA’s banning of Hizballah-affiliated al-Manar satellite television, Hizballah deputies lobbied the French Government in 2005 to lift the ban.  Separately, the Conseil d’Etat, France’s highest administrative court, reviewed an appeal by al-Manar to reinstate its broadcasting license.

French officials were concerned about the role of prisons in converting petty criminals into terrorists.  Prisons served as a center of recruitment for the Safe Bourrada terror network that was dismantled in late September.  According to statistics provided by the Ministry of Justice in September, 358 people are imprisoned for terrorism; of these, 159 are Basque-related, 94 are Islamic extremists, and 76 are Corsica-related. 

Under French law, terrorism suspects may be detained for up to 96 hours before charges are filed.  The new bill proposed extending the 96-hour period an additional 48 hours, for a maximum total detention of six days.  Suspects can be held for up to three and a half years in pretrial detention while the investigation against them continues.  Other measures in the bill included increasing the maximum penalty for association with a terrorist enterprise from ten to 20 years in prison, and increasing the maximum penalty for terrorist enterprise organizers from 20 to 30 years in prison.  The National Assembly approved the bill in late November. 

On January 26, French police arrested 11 people, three of whom eventually were charged with terrorism conspiracy, in Paris’ 19th arrondissement for reportedly recruiting young French residents to launch terrorist attacks in Iraq.  It was the first arrest since the opening in September 2004 of an investigation by the Paris prosecutor’s office into "Jihadists to Iraq."  French intelligence, security, and judicial authorities consistently identified the conflict in Iraq as an attractive force for French extremists and made a number of arrests in 2005.  French officials stated in November that 22 young people had left for Iraq, and at least seven were killed there, including two suicide bombers.

Djamel Beghal, the ringleader of a group arrested in 2001 on suspicion of planning to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Paris, was convicted March 15 for terrorist conspiracy.  Beghal received the maximum ten-year sentence; his five accomplices were also found guilty and received sentences ranging from one to nine years in prison.

The last three French nationals detained at Guantanamo were transferred to French custody on March 7, following the transfer of four other nationals in 2004.  France released Mustaq Ali Patel in March and Imad Kanouni in July.  The other five remain in pretrial detention and could be charged with terrorist conspiracy.  The former Guantanamo detainees’ detention has withstood multiple appeals by defense lawyers.

On April 24, French police in Paris arrested Said al-Maghrebi, an Afghanistan training camp veteran, on suspicion of organizing potential terrorists to fight in Iraq.  Four others reportedly belonging to al-Maghrebi's network were arrested in Paris and Marseilles.  Two were later released.

A French court on May 16 declared five people guilty of organizing logistic support for the suicide bombers who assassinated Afghan commander Ahmed Shah Massoud on September 9, 2001.  The five were sentenced to between two and nine years’ imprisonment.

On May 20, a Paris court condemned Corsican nationalist Charles Pieri to ten years in prison for terrorism finance conspiracy and extortion.

French police arrested nine people in late September on suspicion of belonging to a terrorist group.  According to press reports, the group, reportedly led by GSPC sympathizer and convicted terrorist Safe Bourrada, was in the initial phases of planning terrorist attacks against targets in France, including the Paris Metro, Orly Airport, and the headquarters of the DST, France’s internal security service.  Four more suspected members of the Bourrada network were arrested in early October.

British authorities transferred Rashid Ramda to French custody on December 1.  Ramda is the suspected financier of the 1995 GIA attacks in the Saint-Michel RER train station, the Musee d'Orsay RER train station, and the Maison-Blanche Metro station.  Ramda had been in British custody for the last ten years; his extradition to France removed a major irritant in French-British relations.
 
On December 12, French police arrested approximately 25 people on charges of support for terrorism.  The alleged ringleader is Ouassini Cherifi, a French-Algerian who spent time in prison for passport fraud. 

The judicial investigation into the activities of six suspected members of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) arrested in 2004 continued.  The six suspects were held in pretrial detention and are alleged to have provided logistical support to those who committed the March 2004 Madrid bombings.

Judicial investigations continued following the 2003 arrests of German national Christian Ganczarski and Moroccan national Karim Mehdi, who are suspected of ties to al-Qaida.  Both remained in pretrial detention in France.

Investigations into the "Chechen network," a loose grouping reported to have links with the Beghal network and the Frankfurt network (which attempted in 2000 to attack cultural sites in Strasbourg, including the cathedral) concluded, although a trial date for those arrested was not set.  Several suspected members of the “Chechen network” were arrested in France; members of that network allegedly were interested in using chemical agents to commit terrorist attacks. 

Georgia

More than 90 Georgian Government officials participated in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) programs.  These graduates provided valuable criminal investigative assistance to a number of high-profile criminal incidents, including a car bomb explosion in Gori, Georgia, and an incident in May in Tbilisi's Freedom Square in which a deranged individual threw a grenade at President George W. Bush during his public address.  The United States began a new military training program in Georgia aimed at supporting Georgia's efforts to assist in the stabilization of Iraq, where Georgia currently has 850 troops.

Georgian internal troops continued to carry out operations to rid the Pankisi Gorge of terrorists.  The identification and safe removal of hidden weapon caches in the Pankisi area enabled Georgian security forces to better secure it and to protect against terrorist acts or transit.  Although border guard and customs reform continued, Georgia was still used to a limited degree as a transit state for weapons and money.  Georgia made efforts to close its borders to those who wished to smuggle money, weapons, and supplies, but was hindered in particular by corruption at border checkpoints.

Germany

German cooperation with the United States on the counterterrorism front remained strong, although sometimes limited by German laws and procedures.  Throughout the year, German law enforcement authorities conducted numerous actions against individuals, organizations, and mosques suspected of involvement in terrorism.  In some cases, German authorities charged individuals with membership in terrorist organizations, specifically al-Qaida, Ansar al-Islam, or the Kongra-Gel/PKK.  In other instances, German officials took action against crimes such as document fraud, illegal residency, or weapons law violations.

As of the end of the year, German authorities were investigating 186 cases of terrorism-related crimes nationwide; there were a few high profile cases where German courts did not convict suspects accused of terrorism and related crimes. 

German laws and traditional procedures, as well as the courts’ long-standing and expansive view of civil liberties, sometimes limited the success of cases prosecutors brought to trial.  On August 19, a Hamburg court convicted Moroccan citizen Mounir el Motassadeq in a retrial for his membership in a terrorist organization and sentenced him to seven years in prison.  A Hamburg court released another "Hamburg cell" suspect, Moroccan citizen Abdelghani Mzoudi, in February 2004, based on the claim that prosecutors were unable to obtain potentially exculpatory evidence presumably held by the United States.  Prosecutors appealed, but on June 9 a federal court upheld the acquittal.  German officials had already begun the process to expel Mzoudi when he voluntarily departed Germany for Morocco on June 21, on the eve of his deportation.

On December 15, a German panel of three judges released Mohammed Ali Hamadi, convicted by a German court in 1989 for the 1985 killing of U.S. Navy diver Robert D. Stethem and the hijacking of a TWA flight.  Although sentenced to life in prison, according to German law Hamadi was eligible for parole after 15 years’ imprisonment.  The judicial panel rejected Hamadi's release when they first considered it in late 2001.  When he was released, Hamadi had served 19 years in jail.  Senior USG officials had strongly urged German authorities not to release Hamadi.

On May 31, a Bavarian court began the trial of Iraqi citizen Lokman Amin Mohammed, accused of logistical, financial, and recruiting support for Ansar al-Islam. 

German law enforcement officials arrested three alleged members of Ansar al-Islam in December 2004 on charges of plotting an attack on then-Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi during his visit to Berlin.  On November 16, the Federal Prosecutor formally charged them with the planned murder of Allawi, financial crimes, and membership in, financing, and recruiting for a foreign terrorist organization.  All three remained in custody with legal proceedings underway.

A Berlin court convicted Tunisian national Ishan Garnaoui on April 6 on charges of tax evasion, illegal possession of weapons, and violation of the immigration law.  The court sentenced him to three years and nine months in prison, but acquitted him of the terrorism charges.  Prosecutors are appealing the terrorism acquittal.  Garnaoui was first arraigned in March 2003 for attempting to form a terrorist organization and planning to attack U.S. and Jewish targets in Germany.

On October 26, a Düsseldorf court convicted four members of the al Tawhid terrorist group on charges of membership in a terrorist organization, forgery, and violations of weapons laws.  They were sentenced to prison terms ranging from five to eight years.  The court established that the group's leader was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and that the defendants had planned terrorist attacks against Jewish and Israeli targets in Berlin and Düsseldorf.

In October 2004, German authorities arrested Syrian-German dual national Mamoun Darkazanli for extradition to Spain, where a 2003 arrest warrant accused him of membership in al-Qaida and providing it logistical and financial support.  German authorities used the new EU arrest warrant, which enables swifter German extradition of its own citizens.  On July 18, however, the German Constitutional Court voided the German law implementing the EU arrest warrant, criticized its lack of protections for German nationals, and ordered Darkazanli released.  The Justice Minister immediately announced she would act to get the provision reinstated.  German authorities have not indicted Darkazanli under German law.

The German Interior Ministry used its authority under the Law on Associations to ban organizations that it believed were connected to terrorist groups.  Germany has banned a number of such organizations in recent years.  On August 30, the Interior Ministry banned Yatim Children's Aid on the grounds of its being a successor organization to al-Aqsa.  The Interior Ministry had banned the al-Aqsa Foundation in 2002 on the grounds that it provided financial support to HAMAS; a German court upheld the ban in 2004.  The European Union added al-Aqsa to its list of entities subject to asset freezes in 2005, following a German proposal.  On February 25, Germany banned the Yeni Akit publishing house in Moerfelden-Walldorf on the grounds of distributing anti-Semitic, anti-Western, and anti-Israeli propaganda.

German authorities issued several indictments and made a number of arrests related to the Turkish terrorist group Kongra-Gel/PKK.  The Federal Prosecutor charged some with positions of leadership in Kongra-Gel fundraising.  German officials arrested one prominent suspect, but a German court subsequently released him, finding that there was insufficient evidence from Turkey, which had requested his extradition.  On September 5 the Interior Ministry banned E. Xani Press and Publishing Company, publisher of the pro Kongra-Gel newspaper "Ozgur Politika", on the grounds of its being its mouthpiece. 
E. Xani appealed the ban, and at the end of October the courts suspended the ban.

Germany participated in Department of Homeland Security programs to combat terrorism, including the Container Security Initiative in the ports of Hamburg and Bremerhaven.  The Transportation Security Administration’s presence in Frankfurt, together with U.S. and German air marshals, formed key parts of bilateral efforts to provide air transport security for the six German airports with flights to the United States.

In a German initiative, Germany and five other EU countries signed an agreement on
May 27 that deepened law enforcement cooperation.  The agreement enabled faster sharing of information, DNA, and fingerprint data.  

Germany proposed several names for designation by the UN Security Council 1267 Committee to enable worldwide asset freezes and travel bans.  The United Nations added those names to its list of individuals and entities on December 6.

Greece

With improved counterterrorism infrastructure in place following the August 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, Greece continued its work to fight domestic and international terrorism throughout the year.  In October, the Greek Government passed a bill aimed at combating money laundering and terror finance, bringing Greek legislation in line with EU directives.  Under the new legislation, the Greek Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) enjoyed broadened investigative authority; financing terrorism is defined as a predicate offense and subject to harsh penalties.  Greece signed the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism in November.

Greece sustained its participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan by continuing to provide a unit from the Greek Corps of Engineers and a NATO medical unit in Kabul.  In October, Greece took the lead for security at Kabul International Airport. 

Appellate courts released Christos Tsigaridas, a convicted terrorist and founding member of the domestic terrorist group People's Revolutionary Struggle (ELA), for a variety of medical conditions.  The courts also suspended on medical grounds the sentence of Pavlos Serifis, a convicted member of the leftist terrorist group 17 November (17N).  Serifis attracted media attention upon his release by filing a petition with the European Court of Human Rights to protest the "inhumane conditions" of his imprisonment.  The Court accepted the petition, and other 17N prisoners have since lodged complaints on similar grounds.  In November, another convicted ELA member, Eirini Athanassaki, had her 25-year sentence suspended unanimously by an appellate court so that she could care for her elderly and ailing parents.  Despite these releases, a Greek court in October denied the plea for release on medical grounds of 17N prisoner Savvas Xiros, whose botched bombing attempt in June 2002 led to his arrest and the subsequent arrest and trial of several members of the 17N organization.

In July, after a five-month process, a second trial for members of the ELA terrorist organization resulted in acquittals for all six defendants.  The court tried the defendants in connection with a 1985-1995 bombing campaign against government buildings and the 1994 bombing of a police bus that resulted in the death of an officer.  Three of the six defendants were already serving 25-year sentences for other ELA offenses, which were unaffected by the acquittals.  Yannis Serifis, a cousin of Pavlos Serifis and suspected terrorist leader himself who was tried and acquitted in 2003 for his ties to 17N, stood trial for the first time as a member of the ELA.  Authorities alleged that Serifis was involved in the 1994 police officer's murder, but the court acquitted him on all charges due to lack of evidence.

A group appeals trial for fifteen 17N convicts and two previously acquitted individuals opened December 2.  In December 2003, Greek courts had handed down multiple life sentences to key 17N members who were responsible over the years for hundreds of crimes and the murders of 13 Greeks and five U.S. Government employees.  The appeals trials essentially represented a new trial for the convicts, since new facts and evidence can be introduced in the Greek judicial system.  Additionally, Constantinos Avramidis, a self-confessed member of anarchist organizations, was arrested and indicted as a member of 17N in October.  His trial still was not scheduled by the end of the year.  Top Greek law enforcement officials maintained that further investigation of 17N suspects and evidence is ongoing, and that the case is not considered closed.

Similarly, police officials have not closed their investigation of the December 2004 killing of a Greek Special Guard at his post outside the residence of the British Defense Attaché.  Greek authorities continued to regard this case as a domestic terrorist incident.

Anarchists periodically attacked what they call “imperialist-capitalist targets” with such tools as firebombs and Molotov cocktails.  Since these attacks usually occurred in the middle of the night, few persons were seriously injured and there were no deaths.  The perpetrators were not caught.  Police have made some inroads against the anarchists; after a May incident in which anarchists threw Molotov cocktails at a police bus and stole police riot gear, police arrested two suspects in July after observing them attempting to dispose of the gear.  The three suspects (another was arrested shortly thereafter) were charged on several felony counts.  They remained in custody awaiting trial and were the subject of periodic demonstrations of support by the anarchist community.

Hungary

Hungary continued to support U.S. counterterrorism initiatives and contributed 186 personnel to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.  Hungary fields a light infantry reconnaissance company, a non-combatant medical unit, and a contingent of air traffic controllers.  In addition, 18 Hungarian personnel are assigned to the NATO training mission in Iraq.  Hungary donated to the Iraqi Army 77 T-72 tanks and four support vehicles that arrived in time for the crucial December parliamentary elections.

U.S.- Hungarian cooperation on export and border controls is outstanding.  In September, the United States and Hungary signed a cooperative agreement for the destruction of Hungary's stockpile of 1,540 SA-7 man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) missiles and related equipment.  Final destruction and verification were completed later in the year.

Iceland

In May, Iceland signed both the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism CETS No. 196 and the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism CETS No. 198.

In support of maritime security, the Government of Iceland gave increased attention to scenarios involving large passenger and cargo vessels.  In August, the Icelandic EOD unit conducted a bomb disposal exercise at Sundahofn port in Reykjavik on an American cruise liner, the Seven Seas Navigator. 

Ireland

There were notable positive developments in Irish counterterrorism cooperation.  A remarkable change from 2004 was the September 26 decommissioning of weapons by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).  In addition, Ireland passed new counterterrorism legislation, signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) with the United States, and came into compliance with a 2004 UN International Maritime Organization code. 

On March 9, the Irish Government made strides in strengthening counterterrorism legislation when President Mary McAleese signed the Criminal Justice (Terrorism Offenses) Bill into law.  It enabled Ireland to ratify and accede to four international conventions and protocols on terrorism, and significantly strengthened the government's ability to seize assets and prosecute those suspected of supporting terrorism.

Before this law was passed, authorities could only pursue and prosecute terrorist suspects if they committed criminal offenses in Ireland or were designated by the United Nations or EU.  On September 15, Ireland signed, subject to ratification, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
In July, the government completed the installation of new counterterrorist security measures at Irish international seaports, bringing Ireland into compliance with the UN International Maritime Organization (IMO) code established in July 2004.  These arrangements are aimed at preventing a terrorist strike on Ireland or the use of Irish ports for an attack on another country.  In July, the Irish Justice Minister and the U.S. Ambassador signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) to further increase cooperation in the fight against global crime and terrorism.  This agreement allows for more bilateral cooperation in police investigations and updated rules on extraditions.  Nonetheless, the Irish courts' restrictive approach to carrying out extraditions continued to be of concern to U.S. officials.

In August, three men who had been found guilty in Colombia of aiding Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) terrorists secretly returned to Ireland to escape Colombian prison sentences.  They were detained and questioned by the Irish national police but released without charge.  The Colombian Government requested their extradition.  Ireland does not have an extradition treaty with Colombia, but the case remains under review.  The Irish Director of Public Prosecutions is investigating whether charges can be brought against one of the three for traveling on a false passport.

On July 28, a spokesman for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) made a statement calling for an end to the PIRA’s armed campaign and instructed its members to cease all forms of illegal PIRA activity.  The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning announced on September 26 its judgment that the PIRA had “put beyond use … all the arms in the IRA’s possession.”  The Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) reported that since the September decommissioning, PIRA did not demonstrate any evidence of training and recruitment of terrorists or intent to return to violence.

The IMC released reports on paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland.  The Seventh Report of the IMC, published in October, analyzed continued activity in the Republic of Ireland by the following terrorist groups:

The Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) maintained its terrorist capacity and was capable of effective sporadic attacks.  The IMC reported that CIRA intends to continue to engage in terrorism and other crime.  In the Republic, two CIRA members were arrested in January in possession of an under-car explosive, and nine members were imprisoned for charges related to 2003 arrests.  Two members were also convicted of unlawful possession of firearms.  In December, the Special Criminal Court in Dublin charged a man with possession of an improvised explosive device and membership in an unlawful organization styling itself the Irish Republican Army.  Police are investigating his links to CIRA.  The case was still pending at year's end.

The Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) continued to be a threat.  The IMC reported that RIRA is committed to terrorism as a result of its continued efforts to gain and train members in the use of explosives.  In the Republic, five people were convicted of membership in RIRA this year.

In the first half of 2005, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) maintained its capacity as a terrorist organization.  The IMC reported during this period that PIRA decreased its involvement in violence, but increased its participation in organized criminal activity.  It was unclear how active PIRA was in the Irish Republic, but Irish Government officials suspected continued recruitment of members until the July 28 statement ending PIRA’s armed campaign.  Prior to this statement, the Justice Minister estimated there were approximately 1,500 active members in PIRA.

Italy

Italy worked to fight terrorism within its borders, cooperated internationally, and participated in Coalition activities with a strong military presence in peacekeeping operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Italy’s law enforcement authorities maintained an initiative against locally based terrorist suspects through investigations, detentions, prosecutions, and expulsions.  In extensive raids throughout Italy on May 18-19, law enforcement officials arrested 18 individuals associated with the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group and Ansar al-Islam.  After the July 7 bombings in London, Italian law enforcement officials detained multiple terrorist suspects and quickly passed enhanced counterterrorism legislation that increased the government’s ability to expel extremists considered a threat to national security, authorized improved surveillance techniques, and brought Internet operators under state supervision. 

Italy expelled 13 individuals in the interest of national security, including Turin-based Imam Bouchta Bouriki.  The closely coordinated investigation, arrest, and extradition of failed London suicide bomber Hamdi Isaac is an example of effective international cooperation.  Law enforcement authorities arrested Casablanca bombing suspect El Bahri Abdelouahed on May 9.  Italy has submitted more names of suspected terrorist financiers to the UN 1267 Committee than any country other than the United States.

A controversial judicial decision to release three suspected terrorists, on the grounds that their activities to recruit fighters for the insurgency in Iraq did not “necessarily constitute terrorist activity,” complicated the government's aggressive campaign to pursue terrorist suspects and resulted in calls for increased coordination of national terrorism prosecutions. 

Domestic anarchist-inspired terrorist groups presented a diminished threat as a result of Italian authorities’ continued efforts to dismantle their organizations.  However, the Informal Anarchic Federation claimed responsibility for a series of small package bombs causing minimal damage.  Extremist groups protesting a high-speed train line between Turin and Lyon, France, caused considerable disruption and also threatened violence.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan authorities recognized an indigenous extremist problem following the revelation of participation by Kazakhs in the terrorist bombings in neighboring Tashkent, Uzbekistan in 2004.  Since then, the government has improved counterterrorist legislation and has stepped up cooperation with the United States.

The trial of 16 individuals accused of participating in the 2004 Tashkent bombings resulted in their conviction in December 2005, with sentences of six to 25 years in prison.  At the end of 2005, the Kazakh Parliament was working on a terrorist financing law to make it easier for prosecutors to win convictions.

Kazakhstan had a growing problem with the Islamic extremist group Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), an extremist political movement advocating the establishment of a theocratic Islamic state throughout the entire Muslim world.  HT walked a fine line between free speech and incitement to terrorism, thus creating a high level of concern among Kazakh authorities.  Because existing counterterrorist legislation did not provide legal grounds to designate HT as a terrorist group, the government adopted in February the Law on Extremism creating a new, albeit poorly defined, legal category of banned "extremist" organizations.  To date, HT is the only group designated under this new law.  The United States has no evidence that HT committed acts of international terrorism, but the group's radical anti-American and anti-Semitic ideology is sympathetic to acts of violence against the United States and its allies. 

The United States added the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), sometimes called the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), to its list of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations.  The IJU is a terrorist splinter group from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) that appeared in southern Kazakhstan.  (See Chapter 8, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information.)

Kazakhstan, along with China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which established a regional antiterrorism center in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.  Kazakhstan is also a member of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasia Group, a regional anti-money laundering organization, or Financial Action Task Force-style regional body, that includes Belarus, China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia.  Kazakhstani cooperation and timeliness in sharing terror-related information with the United States improved.  In November, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Defense Threat Reduction Organization held a one-week training class in Kazakhstan on combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  Kazakhstani participants were drawn from the Committee for National Security, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Border Guards, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Kyrgyzstan

Following the change of government in March, Kyrgyzstan remained a dependable and outspoken ally in the global war on terror, taking political, legislative, and law enforcement initiatives to disrupt and deter terrorism.  In August President Bakiyev signed a law on counteracting extremist activities.  In September he signed a decree creating a special agency targeting terrorism financing and money laundering.  In October, however, the Parliament rejected by one vote a draft law on money laundering that would have increased Kyrgyzstan's efforts in fighting terrorism financing and opened up further international cooperation.

Kyrgyzstan's military and internal forces worked to improve their counterterrorism capabilities and to expand cooperation with regional partners in 2005.  Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), which established lists of banned terrorist groups in an effort to streamline cooperation.  With U.S. assistance, the Kyrgyz National Guard opened a counterterrorism training center in January. 

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), banned as an extremist group since 2003, is a political movement that advocates the overthrow of existing governments and their replacement by a borderless state throughout the Muslim world.  HT is highly secretive and organized on a cell-based structure.  It has followers in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Germany, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and the Middle East.  Local specialists estimate that there are more than 5,000 HT members in Kyrgyzstan, located primarily among Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic Uzbek population in the south but with growing support in the north as well.  Although the government generally does not arrest individuals for being members of HT, police detained 73 individuals this year for distributing HT literature and shut down a HT printing facility in Jalalabad in May. 

The United States has no evidence that HT has committed any acts of international terrorism, but the group's radical anti-American and anti-Semitic ideology is sympathetic to acts of violence against the United States and its allies.  HT has publicly called on Muslims to travel to Iraq and Afghanistan to fight Coalition forces.

Latvia

Latvia contributed troops to Coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and cooperated productively with the United States on money laundering and terrorist finance concerns. 

Latvia's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) continued to maintain a terrorist financing (OFAC) database that it shared with local banks.  Bilateral efforts to combat financial crime accelerated, and the Latvian Government and Latvian banks continued to take steps to strengthen anti-money laundering and “Know Your Customer” regimes against possible terrorist exploitation.  In response to U.S. concerns about financial crime, the Latvian Parliament in May passed an anti-money laundering legislative package that introduced enhanced regulatory and law enforcement measures designed to strengthen the government's ability to combat financial crime.

Latvia contributed a ten-person team to support the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan; in October, the team's mandate was renewed for 12 months.  In Iraq, Latvia contributed up to 137 soldiers under Polish command. 

Lithuania

In January, the Lithuanian Parliament approved a new national security strategy that cited international terrorism as a threat to Lithuania’s security.  In September, Lithuania’s State Security Department established an antiterrorism division.  Lithuanian law enforcement cooperated fully in monitoring and freezing assets of suspected terrorists. 

Lithuania had approximately 55 troops in Iraq, including three trainers in the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I).  In Afghanistan, Lithuania has committed to deploying 40 Special Operations Force personnel when their current training rotation ends.  Lithuania also leads a Provincial Reconstruction Team in western Afghanistan’s remote Ghor Province that undertook water sanitation and bridge-building projects and repaired a community orphanage and mosque.

Macedonia

Macedonia was a ready and willing partner in the global war on terror on multiple fronts, increasing its participation in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Iraq to 40 officers and Special Forces.   

The Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program office conducted six antiterrorism training courses for Macedonia.  More than 120 Macedonian officials participated in this training, which was designed to assist Macedonia in countering the threat of terrorism. 

Malta

Malta made significant progress in the area of customs inspection and border security procedures, helped by extensive U.S. assistance.  Improvements included establishment both of the authority for Maltese Customs to inspect goods transiting the container port (Malta Freeport) and the necessary procedures for effectively using the container-scanning the Cargo, Vehicle, and Container Inspection System (VACIS) system to prevent the transshipment of WMD material through the Freeport.

In June, the Maltese Parliament approved an amendment to the criminal code to include provisions on terrorism.  The bill defined, for the first time, an "act of terror" and "terrorism," and specifically enumerated actions that constitute the offense.  The legal notice making this act law has not yet been issued.  Regardless, provisions exist in Maltese law that provide adequate opportunity to prosecute and punish terrorist acts or activities.

U.S. and Maltese authorities reached agreement in November on new extradition and legal assistance agreements following more than a year of negotiations. 

Malta criminalized terrorist financing in 2005.  In 2002, the criminal code was amended in such a way that terrorist financing would meet the standard for categorization as a serious crime under Malta's Prevention of Money Laundering Act.  On June 6, the Act was extensively amended and expanded to include provisions on funding of terrorism. 

Moldova

Moldova has deployed to Iraq three separate contingents of servicemen, a total of 55, who specialize in demining, liaison, and convoy security.  The separatist-controlled Transnistria region of Moldova remains a potential area for terrorist activity.  There have been documented instances of contraband smuggling and suspicions of weapons smuggling remain.  Moldova  participated in a number of theoretical and practical antiterrorism assistance training events, seminars, exchanges, and conferences organized by the U.S. Embassy.

The Netherlands

The Netherlands continued to respond to the global terrorist threat with leadership and energy in the areas of border and shipping security, terrorist financing, and support of efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The Netherlands has 378 personnel deployed to the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan’s Baghlan province as part of the NATO ISAF mission, and 254 personnel and Special Forces participating in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan since April 18 on a one-year deployment.  Dutch OEF personnel and Special Forces troops (more than 700) supportorted of the Afghan elections in August.  The Dutch pledged 75 million euros toward the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund to support the transition from humanitarian to reconstruction assistance between 2004 and 2006.

In July, the Amsterdam District Court sentenced Mohammed Bouyeri to life imprisonment for the murder of film director Theo van Gogh, the attempted murder of eight police officers, and threatening the life of MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali.  The court found that Bouyeri acted "with terrorist intent" in November 2004 when he murdered Van Gogh, impeded the work of Hirsi Ali, and possessed a firearm.  Bouyeri did not appeal the verdict.  Bouyeri is also charged, along with 13 other alleged members of the so-called Hofstad group, with membership in a terrorist organization.  The trial of these 14 alleged members of the Hofstad terrorist network began on December 5.  The 14, including Bouyeri, were charged with participating in a criminal organization "with terrorist intent."  Bouyeri was not sentenced because he is already serving a life term.  This was the first case tried under the Terrorist Crimes Act that took effect in August 2004.  Under the Act, membership in a terrorist group is a crime; ordinary group members may be sentenced to a maximum jail sentence of eight years, and leaders to 15 years. 

A new terror alert system became operational in June.  This early warning system was designed to trigger a clear and rapid response to terrorist threats by both the public and private sector.  It linked the sector-specific measures to the latest threat information from the National Counterterrorism Coordinator.  There are four alert levels: basic, low, moderate, and high threat.  Initially, the port of Rotterdam, Schiphol Airport, the petrochemical industry, the railways, and the water supply sector were included; the natural gas, electricity, and nuclear sectors were added in October.  By 2007, a total of 14 sectors will be part of the system.  The first bi-annual national counterterrorism exercise, "Operation Bonfire," was held in the spring.

Using national sanctions authority, the Dutch blocked the accounts and financial transactions of a HAMAS fundraiser, the al-Aqsa Foundation, and the al-Qaida-affiliated Benevolence International Nederland in 2003.  In July 2004, the Netherlands froze all financial assets of the Dutch branch of al-Haramain.  The Dutch have been active in seeking support for an EU designation of Hizballah as a terrorist group.  They also played a crucial leadership role in establishment of an informal US-EU dialogue on terrorism finance, pursuant to commitments of the June 2004 US-EU Declaration on Combating Terrorism. 

Norway
 
Alleged Ansar al-Islam leader Mullah Krekar continued to reside freely in Norway but was unable to travel abroad, as his travel documents were confiscated, and he remained under a government expulsion order.  In September, the Oslo City Court rejected Krekar's suit against the government's expulsion decision.  He appealed, and resolution of his case in the Norwegian courts is expected to take months if not years.  The new government said that it will continue to pursue Krekar's expulsion, and that he would be returned to Iraq as soon as there is an agreement with the new Iraqi Government on the conditions for his return.

Poland

Poland worked to fight terrorism within its borders, cooperated in international counterterrorism efforts, and participated in Coalition activities with a strong presence in peacekeeping operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

In May, Polish border guards conducted a one-week training program in railway inspections for their counterparts from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Croatia. 

Chechen refugees from Russia continued to enter Poland, with 6,500 arriving in 2004.   Most of these refugees simply transited Poland to other EU countries.  However, some legitimately sought refuge in Poland.  Poland granted refuge to 200 Chechen refugees in 2005, while three others were denied refuge following adverse security checks by Poland’s internal security agency.

Portugal

Indian terrorist Abu Salem Ansari, whom the Portuguese arrested in September 2002, was extradited to India with his wife and codefendant Monica Bedi in November after they exhausted their appeals.  Salem was convicted by the Portuguese High Court in November 2004 of using false documents, making false statements, resisting arrest, and bribing a law enforcement officer.  He was sentenced to prison for four years and six months; Bedi was sentenced to two years.  Salem was wanted in India for suspected involvement in a series of 1993 bomb blasts that left 278 dead in Mumbai, and for more than 20 other high-profile murders, money laundering, and extortion.  He was also sought for his criminal association with notorious underworld figure Dawood Ibrahim, who is on New Delhi's list of 20 most wanted criminals.

In July, Portugal formally agreed to join the Container Security Initiative; its office is now staffed and fully functioning.  That same month, Portugal and the United States signed bilateral Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance instruments.

Romania

Romania’s President Basescu stressed the importance of a proactive approach to fighting terrorism that involves taking concrete steps beyond Romania's national borders.  About 1,400 Romanian troops serve in Iraq and Afghanistan, and President Basescu and other senior leaders said publicly that Romania would maintain its commitment of troops in both countries as long as necessary.

In the fall, Romania deported five students for allegedly having ties to al-Qaida and attempting to recruit supporters.  The five had been under surveillance since early 2005.  A Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) spokesman stated that "the operation aimed to stop this radical Islamic group in Romania and remove these people from the national territory."

The Romanian Government established internal mechanisms to combat terrorism, including adoption of a national antiterrorism strategy.  In February, the government adopted an ordinance, enacted by Parliament in May as Law 162/2005, modifying and strengthening the law regarding the establishment of the Directorate for Terrorism and Organized Crime Investigations.

Bucharest is the site of the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI), a regional center that provides law enforcement training and intelligence sharing on transborder criminal activities, including terrorism, for 12 member countries in Southeast and Central Europe.

In July, Romania ratified the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) Organization's Additional Protocol to Combat Terrorism, signed in Athens in December 2004.  In October, the Romanian Minister of Administration and Interior and his counterparts from 13 other European nations signed an agreement on fighting terrorism, illegal migration, organized crime, and corruption.

Romania adopted adequate legislation to address financial crimes and terrorist financing.  Nevertheless, Romania remains vulnerable to money laundering and other financial crimes that potentially finance terrorist organizations.  Weaknesses include insufficient resources, both of funding and personnel devoted to prosecuting financial crimes.  Romanian financial entities independently identified one case of possible terrorism financing activity in Romania.  Information on the case has been forwarded to the United States.

In August, legislation took effect that extended the jurisdiction of the Romanian Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) beyond money laundering offenses to suspected acts of terrorist financing (Law 230/July 2005 amending Law 656/2003 for the Prevention and Combat of Money Laundering).  The FIU was authorized to conduct proactive investigations.  The law extended the reporting requirements applicable to financial institutions, defined to include banks, insurance companies, gambling firms, and pawn companies, for transactions suspected to involve terrorist financing. 

Russia

A Russian army armored personnel carrier patrols a street of Grozny in October after a roadside blast targeted their convoy in the center of the Chechen capital.  (AFP Photo/Khasan Kaziyev)
In the face of new terrorist attacks on Russian soil, the Russian Government and public continued to view counterterrorism as a top priority.  Much of the terrorist activity in the region and elsewhere in Russia was homegrown and linked to the Chechen separatist movement, although there was evidence of a foreign terrorist presence in Chechnya and of international financial and ideological ties with Chechen groups.  Russia claimed a success in March with the slaying of Chechen separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov; its assertions that the insurgency was terrorist in nature were bolstered by the addition in August of the terrorist Shamil Basayev to the Chechen separatist leadership structure.

Major terrorist incidents in Russia were centered in the north Caucasus and included:

· On July 19, attackers in the village of Znamenskoye in Chechnya blew up a vehicle and fired on a police vehicle, killing 14 and wounding approximately 34, including civilian bystanders.

· On October 13, 200 to 300 gunmen attacked police and military facilities in the city of Nalchik in Kabardino-Balkaria in the north Caucasus, killing 24 law enforcement officials and 12 civilians.  Authorities reported approximately 91 gunmen killed and 39 detained.

All Russian regions passed regulations to strengthen counterterrorism measures in educational, social, and cultural facilities following the 2004 Beslan school siege.  A parliamentary commission worked during the year to examine, among other things, the performance of the federal authorities during the Beslan siege, and its preliminary report on December 28 criticized local authorities. 

The number of domestic terrorism-related investigations and prosecutions expanded in 2005.  One local non-governmental organization reported 28 terrorism-related convictions and 50 pending terrorism trials in Russia by December.  Noteworthy cases included:

· In April, a Moscow court found two airport employees guilty of aiding and abetting the terrorists who brought bombs onto the two Russian airplanes downed in August 2004.

· In May, Russian authorities began the trial of Nurpachi Kuliyev, accused of taking part in the 2004 terrorist school seizure in Beslan.

· In September, three people charged with a gas pipeline explosion in Bugulma (two of them former Guantanamo detainees who had been repatriated to Russia) were acquitted by a jury trial in Tatarstan.

The U.S.-Russia Counterterrorism Working Group (CTWG), co-chaired by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak, met in May and December.  The group fosters cooperation between numerous U.S. agencies and their Russian counterparts on counterterrorism issues.  Notable milestones included the February signing of a comprehensive agreement facilitating information sharing on man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and the November signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on counternarcotics that established closer cooperation and exchange of information.  The FBI and Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) forged a highly productive joint counterterrorism operational capability that led to several arrests and convictions.  

The United States and Russia continued bilateral cooperation to destroy, safeguard, and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  President Bush and President Putin made intensified cooperation on nuclear security a centerpiece of their February summit in Bratislava.

Russia originally proposed and then played a major role in securing consensus in the UN General Assembly to enact on April 13 the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which became the thirteenth UN legal instrument to combat terrorism. 

Russia is an increasingly active member of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (FATF).  After fulfilling its pledge to create a Eurasian FATF-style regional body (FSRB) in 2004, known as the Eurasia Group on Money Laundering (EAG), Russia was the group's leading force and remained its chair.  The EAG, whose members also include Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, made significant progress toward building Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and established the necessary legislative and regulatory frameworks in member states to help those states improve their compliance with international standards. 

Russia used its position in international fora to build cooperative mechanisms and programs to counter terrorism.  For example, Russia led efforts to make counterterrorism cooperation a key element in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Serbia and Montenegro

In June, a Serbian police officer arrested 22-year-old Moroccan Abdelmajid Bouchar while he was traveling by train in Serbia on a false Iraqi passport.  In September, Bouchar was extradited to Spain.  The Spanish Government had sought Bouchar, a member of al-Qaida, for his suspected role in the 2004 Madrid train bombings.  

Serbia and Montenegro created a new directorate, which is still being organized, to coordinate counterterrorism policies and assistance.  The Ministry of Defense’s 2005 strategy highlighted the global war on terror as one of the new fundamental organizing principles for the revamped Serbian and Montenegrin armed forces.  

Kosovo

The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) continued to administer Kosovo pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1244.  UNMIK's Central Intelligence Unit (CIU) continued to monitor suspected terrorist activity in Kosovo.  UNMIK and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) monitored individuals entering Kosovo at official points of entry.  This regulation, in force since July 1, required persons who were not employed by an international organization to register with the KPS' Office of Foreign Registration upon entering Kosovo.

UNMIK police froze the assets of 34 individuals and groups on suspicion of links to terrorist activity.  Kosovo's Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), in cooperation with UNMIK, increased monitoring of 11 foreign NGOs suspected of extremism and issued regulations restricting their activities, including the appropriation of one mosque.  It also required each NGO to submit documentation that explains its projects and shows its bank accounts.  The Kosovo Islamic Community (KIC) evaluated foreign NGOs and prohibited them from using public facilities for gatherings if their views were found to be extremist.

In March, the KPS established an organized crime and terrorist unit, composed of 12 foreign police officers and three KPS officers.  UNMIK initiated an ongoing Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) that recognized Kosovo’s need to increase its internal capacity to prevent such future strategic threats as terrorism, inter-ethnic extremism, organized crime, and corruption. 

Despite these advances, Kosovo's counterterrorism efforts were hampered by porous boundary lines easily crossed by individuals trafficking in people or goods.  An insufficient number of KPS border officials limited the ability to monitor wide expanses of mountainous terrain between crossing points.  Underpaid border and customs officials were often easily corrupted.

Domestic extremist groups or individuals continued to commit inter-ethnic violence and violence against UNMIK employees and property.   Between March and December, there were approximately 18 attacks on public or UN facilities, such as explosive devices damaging vehicles, shots fired at UNMIK vehicles, and grenades or Molotov cocktails thrown near UN vehicles or UNMIK headquarters.  There were no fatalities, although approximately five persons were injured as a result of these attacks.

Slovakia

Slovakia continued to support U.S. counterterrorism initiatives and contributed 57 personnel to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and 112 personnel to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  Slovakia fields a team of deminers and construction engineers in Afghanistan and deminers in Iraq.  Slovakia also donated materiel to the Afghan National Army. 

Slovenia

Slovenia's economic stability and location on the Balkan drug route offered attractive opportunities for money laundering.  Slovenia ratified seven Council of Europe conventions relating to counterterrorism.  In 2003, Slovenia established an inter-ministerial Working Group for Implementing Sanctions and Activities in the War Against Terrorism, whose powers and competencies were re-established on March 24.  In November, Slovenia participated in instructor training on dual-use licensing as part of its ongoing cooperation with the United States under the Export Control and Border Security program.  Slovenia continued to provide police instructors in Amman, Jordan, to train Iraqi policemen.

Spain

Spain arrested scores of individuals with possible links to al-Qaida and related extremist organizations; there were 79 detentions.  At year’s end, 29 of those 79 detainees remained in custody, while the other 50 were released on bail or cleared of charges.  The Minister of Interior reported in October that Spain held a total of 125 Islamist terrorist suspects; that figure rose to 131 total detainees by the end of the year.  These detainees included individuals arrested in 2004 for conspiring to bomb Spain's High Court and other Madrid landmarks.  In April, Switzerland extradited the alleged leader of this conspiracy, Mohamed Achraf, to Spain where he is awaiting trial.  Authorities continued to hold 10 Pakistani nationals arrested in Barcelona in 2004 for allegedly providing logistical support to al-Qaida.

Spain cooperated closely with the United States to investigate and prosecute acts of terrorism and to prevent future attacks.  Spanish authorities provided extensive information for the trial in the United States of Zacarias Moussaoui.  Spanish officials also provided U.S. investigators substantial information regarding the July 2001 visit to Spain of September 11 hijacker Mohamed Atta and other September 11 plotters.

Spain worked hard to disrupt terrorist acts that possibly were directed against U.S. interests.  In June, Spanish police dismantled a network that was facilitating the movement of suicide bombers and other terrorists to Iraq to attack Coalition forces.  On March 11, U.S. Attorney General Gonzales and Spanish Minister of Justice Juan Fernando Lopez Aguilar announced the formation of the U.S.-Spain Counterterrorism Experts Working Group to increase cooperation in terrorism investigations and prosecutions.  This working group brought together prosecutors, investigators, and other experts from both countries; it met twice to discuss terrorism cases of mutual interest. 

Spain cooperated with the Department of Homeland Security on the Container Security Initiative to scan containers bound from the port of Algeciras to the United States for hazardous and illicit materials.  Spain and the United States co-chair the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Terrorism Finance Working Group.  Spain participated in all meetings of the G8 Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG), based on its high level of counterterrorism assistance to third countries.  The Spanish Government prepared but has not yet issued implementation regulations for the 2003 Law to Prevent Terrorist Financing.

A Spanish court sentenced 18 members of an al-Qaida cell to between six and 27 years in prison.  Separately, authorities continued to investigate the March 2004 train bombings in Madrid that killed 191 people and wounded hundreds of others.

On September 26, Spain's High Court convicted Spain-based al-Qaida cell leader Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas and sentenced him to 27 years in prison for membership in a terrorist organization and conspiracy to commit terrorist acts.  Seventeen other members of the Barakat Yarkas cell also were convicted and sentenced to prison terms ranging from six to 11 years; six defendants were acquitted.  Barakat Yarkas, a Syrian immigrant to Spain, was detained in November 2001 on charges of having provided support to al-Qaida and of having helped Mohamed Atta organize the September 11 terrorist attacks.  Among those convicted was al-Jazeera journalist Taysir Alony, who was sentenced to seven years in prison for transporting funds from Barakat Yarkas to terrorists in Afghanistan under his cover as a journalist.

Spanish authorities continued their investigation into the March 2004 Madrid train bombings.  Police arrested 31 individuals in connection with the investigation, bringing to 110 the total number of suspects detained as part of the investigation; 30 suspects remain jailed awaiting trial or further investigation.  In September, Serbian authorities extradited Moroccan national Abdelmajid Bouchar to Spain in response to an international arrest warrant seeking Bouchar for his alleged role in the Madrid train bombings.  Bouchar had escaped a Spanish police raid in Madrid in April 2004 and warned his colleagues of the approaching police, allowing the suspects to barricade themselves in their apartment.  The seven suspected terrorists detonated explosives in the apartment, killing themselves and one police officer. 

In April, Spain joined France, Germany, and Belgium in an agreement to link the criminal record registries of each country to help accelerate background checks on suspected terrorists operating in the region. 

The High Court convicted Spanish national Hamed Abderrahman and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment for membership in a terrorist organization.  Abderrahman was transferred to Spain from the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo in February 2004 at the request of Spanish authorities.

In the Basque region, a Spanish court initiated trial proceedings against 56 individuals charged with providing logistical support to the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) terrorist group.  The case encompassed six separate investigations directed by the National Court against ETA between 1998 and 2002.

Though ETA carried out all the terrorist attacks in Spain in 2005, there were important detentions related to other terrorist groups, including:

· On June 1, a UK judge authorized the extradition to Spain of Moroccan national Farid Hilali.  Spanish investigators believed Hilali was the person referred to as "Shakur" in multiple conversations intercepted by police as part of the Barakat Yarkas case.  In his discussions with Yarkas, "Shakur" indicated significant knowledge of planning for the September 11 attacks in the United States.  At year’s end, Hilali had not yet been transferred to Spanish custody.

· On June 15-28, police undertook "Operation Tigris," arresting 11 individuals on charges of working on behalf of Ansar al-Islam to recruit potential suicide bombers in Spain for operations against Coalition and Iraqi Government forces in Iraq. 

· On November 23, police arrested 11 Algerian nationals on charges of providing financial and logistical support to the Algerian terrorist group GSPC from the proceeds of narcotics trafficking and credit card fraud.  Four of the suspects, Khaled Bakel, Said Bouchema, Salim Zerbouti, and Lyies Sihamida, allegedly sought to purchase explosives and were suspected of having links with extremists in Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Denmark.  The four were held pending further investigation, while the other seven Algerian nationals were released on bail.

· On December 9, authorities arrested seven more suspected GSPC members in several towns along Spain's Mediterranean coast on charges of raising funds for the GSPC through robbery.  According to press reports, this cell was in contact with senior GSPC figures responsible for extending GSPC actions beyond Algeria's borders, and had funded terrorist attacks in North Africa, Afghanistan, and possibly in Pakistan and Chechnya. 

· On December 19, police arrested 19 suspected Islamist extremists on charges of recruiting individuals to carry out suicide bombings in Iraq.  The detainees included 12 Moroccans and one national each from Spain, France, Belarus, Ghana, Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.  The investigating magistrate ordered six of the individuals held in pre-trial detention while the rest were released pending further investigation.  Three of the detainees reportedly served as imams in their local mosques in Malaga and Ceuta.

Spain continued to make progress in its decades-old campaign to eliminate ETA.  Spanish authorities arrested 71 individuals for membership in or association with ETA and dismantled six ETA operational cells.  Spain cooperated with French authorities in this effort, with French police arresting 33 suspected ETA members and extraditing five of them to Spain to stand trial.  Spanish authorities charged 41 members of ETA's illegal political front group Batasuna, including senior Batasuna figure Arnaldo Otegi, with membership in a terrorist organization and providing financial support to ETA.  As of December 12, ETA had carried out 30 bombings; although there were no deaths as a result of these attacks, there were injuries and significant property damage. 

The conviction in September of Imad Eddin Barakat Arkas and 17 associates was believed to have significantly reduced al-Qaida's direct presence in Spain, although al-Qaida affiliates and supporters appeared to remain active.

The Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) was believed to be active among extremist elements in Spain's large Moroccan immigrant community.  Many of the Madrid train bombing suspects had direct or indirect relationships with the GICM.  GICM figure Hassan El Haski and three associates were arrested in Spain in December 2004.

The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) is known to use Spain as a logistical base and transit point.  On November 23, authorities arrested 11 Algerian citizens on charges of raising funds for the GSPC through drug trafficking and credit card fraud.  Police released seven on bail, but continued to hold four of the suspects on charges that they also sought to obtain explosives.  On December 9, police arrested a second group of seven GSPC members on similar charges.

Police believed that the Iraqi terrorist group Ansar al-Islam was the main organizer of a terrorist facilitation network that funneled potential suicide bombers from Spain to Iraq, primarily through Syria.  In June, police arrested 11 individuals on charges of recruiting terrorists for Ansar al-Islam.

Authorities believed they had nearly eradicated the extreme leftist First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO), but a joint Spanish, French, and Italian police operation in October that resulted in the arrest of two GRAPO members led observers to speculate that the group possibly was reconstituting itself.

Sweden

In June, the Swedish Foreign Minister approved a new counterterrorism strategy for MFA activities.  This strategy called for increased multilateral cooperation, increased capacity building and prevention through foreign assistance, and improved internal analysis and threat assessment. 

Sweden contributed US $125,000 to the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation, a collaborative endeavor spearheaded by the Australian and Indonesian governments to increase regional counterterrorism cooperation in Southeast Asia.

In May, the Stockholm District Court convicted two Iraqi citizens living in Sweden of conspiracy to commit terrorist crimes in Iraq.  The court found the men guilty of violating Sweden’s 2003 Terrorism Law for having sent money to the terrorist organization Ansar-al Islam.  The two men, 25-year-old Fermi Abdullah and 29-year-old Ali Berzenghi, were sentenced to six and seven years in prison, respectively.  Both appealed the conviction, which an appeals court subsequently upheld.  The appeals court, however, lowered Berzenghi's sentence to five years in prison and Abdullah's to four years and six months.  It additionally found both men guilty of violating the 2002 terrorist financing act and ordered that both be expelled from Sweden upon completion of their sentences.  This case marked the first occasion in which Sweden convicted individuals under both the 2003 Terrorism Law and the 2002 Terrorist Financing Act.

In November, Bosnian authorities in Sarajevo arrested Mirsad Bektasevic, an 18-year-old man with Bosnian and Swedish citizenship, on suspicion of conspiracy to commit terrorist acts.  Swedish police initiated an investigation into this case.

Pursuant to a U.S. arrest warrant and INTERPOL Red Notice, Czech authorities in December arrested Oussama Kassir, a Lebanese-born Swedish national, as he was in transit from Stockholm to Lebanon.  Kassir was wanted in the United States on allegations that he had conspired to provide material support to terrorists in the planned establishment of a terrorist training camp in Bly, Oregon.  At the end of 2005, Kassir remained in Czech custody pending extradition to the United States. 

Sweden endorsed the June 2004 revised EU Plan of Action on combating terrorism, as well as the European Commission's September 2005 communication on terrorist recruitment, which subsequently was approved by the European Council in December.  In May, at a summit meeting in Warsaw, Sweden signed the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, an instrument to increase the effectiveness of existing international texts on the fight against terrorism.  Sweden is an active participant in EUROPOL and EUROJUST, European law enforcement institutions that coordinate member states' counterterrorism cooperation and activities.  Sweden participates in the Nordic Council of Ministers’ Regional Forum for Nordic Governmental Cooperation.

Sweden freezes assets of entities and persons on the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee list once the EU takes action.  It also acts on entities designated by the UN Clearinghouse process.  Sweden has not yet proposed individuals or entities for inclusion on any such lists.  Assets of Ahmed Yusuf, one of three Swedes designated on UN and EU lists in 2002 for connections with the al-Barakat terrorist organization, remained frozen by Swedish authorities. 

Tajikistan

Sharing a 1,400-kilometer border with Afghanistan, Tajikistan is well aware of the negative effects of state-sponsored terrorism and offered its limited resources to assist the United States unconditionally.  Tajikistan allowed its territory and air space to be used for counterterrorist actions.  The Tajik Government's main impediment to counterterrorism performance remains its lack of resources.

Within the framework of the war on terrorism, Tajikistan prohibited extremist-oriented activities and closely monitored terrorist groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and extremist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT).  Tajikistan participated in the counterterrorist activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Commonwealth Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the CIS Counterterrorist Center.

In 2005, approximately 74 members of HT were arrested and 44 HT activists arrested the previous year were convicted and sentenced to prison terms of three to 20 years. 

Turkey

Domestic and transnational terrorist groups have targeted Turks and foreigners, sometimes including U.S. Government personnel, for more than 40 years.  International and domestic terrorist groups operating in Turkey include Marxist-Leninist, radical Islamist, separatist, and pro-Chechen groups. 

In August, Turkish authorities arrested Luay Sakka, a Syrian national linked to al-Qaida and the Zarqawi network.  Sakka is an important international terrorist, connected to the funding of the November 2003 Istanbul bombings and the deaths of U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq.  Sakka was in Turkey allegedly plotting a terrorist attack on Israeli cruise ships in Turkish ports.

A criminal trial is underway for dozens of defendants allegedly involved in the November 2003 Istanbul bombings. The lead defendants admitted to contacts with al-Qaida and warned of further attacks if Turkey continues to cooperate with the United States and Israel.  Most of the other defendants, however, denied responsibility for or knowledge of the bombings.

In addition to sharing intelligence information on various groups operating in Turkey, the Turkish National Police (TNP) and the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) conducted an aggressive counterterrorist campaign and detained numerous suspected terrorists in scores of raids, disrupting these groups before terrorist acts could be carried out.  Overall, in the last five years the Government of Turkey has worked closely with the United States in the apprehension, conviction, and punishment of those responsible for terrorist attacks in Turkey.  However, Turkish law still defines terrorism as attacks against Turkish citizens and the Turkish state.  Though the government recognizes the need to align this legal definition with international norms, the old definition has yet to be amended.  The TNP continues to provide excellent protection of U.S. diplomatic and military facilities throughout Turkey; its response is always immediate and substantial when alerted to threats or incidents involving U.S. interests.  Similar to the handling of security at high profile events such as the Istanbul NATO Summit in 2004, security at the World University Games that took place in August in Izmir was appropriately proactive and without incident.

Turkey commanded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan for a second time from February to August, contributing 1,500 troops. 

Turkey permitted the transport to Iraq of humanitarian goods, contributed humanitarian goods and services, and helped re-supply Coalition forces in Iraq with the transport and sale of fuel, food, and water.  Turkey also allowed Incirlik Air Base to be used as a cargo hub for non-lethal goods transported to support OIF and OEF, and for the outbound rotation of U.S. troops returning from Iraq.  Turkey was active in reconstruction efforts, including providing electricity to Iraq.  Some 70 Turkish citizens were killed providing logistical support to Coalition forces or performing reconstruction in Iraq.  Turkey contributed headquarters personnel to the NATO training mission in Iraq, helped train Iraqi diplomats and political parties, and offered senior military leadership training in Turkey as a further contribution to NATO’s Iraq Training Mission.

Turkey’s ongoing struggle against the Kongra-Gel/PKK was marked by increased violence across Turkey.  In the Southeast, Turkish security forces were active in the struggle against the Kongra-Gel/PKK. There were a number of bombings and attempted bombings in resort areas in western Turkey and Istanbul, some of which resulted in civilian casualties.  A Kurdish separatist group calling itself the Kurdish Freedom Falcons (TAK), widely believed to be affiliated with the Kongra-Gel/PKK, claimed responsibility for many of these attacks. 

Turkey is working to strengthen its counterterrorism finance regime for an upcoming peer review under the auspices of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).  Pursuant to its obligations under UNSCR 1267 and subsequent resolutions, Turkish officials continue to pass UN and U.S.-designated names of terrorists to all law enforcement and intelligence agencies, as well as to financial institutions.  The Government of Turkey submitted legislation to Parliament that will explicitly criminalize terrorism finance and offer safe harbor protection for filers of suspicious transaction reports (STRs).

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan's strategic location bordering Iran, Russia, Afghanistan, and the Caspian Sea makes it a possible route for narcotics smuggling and money laundering.  Despite a lack of formal cooperation on counterterrorism activities, three government officials participated in the U.S.-OSCE sponsored Conference on Combating Terrorist Financing held in Vienna in November.  Since late 2001, Turkmenistan has granted blanket overflight rights for U.S. aircraft supporting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).  CENTCOM is contributing $5 million to build two border crossing stations on Turkmenistan’s borders with Afghanistan and Iran.

United Kingdom

London suffered terrorist attacks on July 7 and July 21.  The July 7 attacks were carried out by four suicide bombers who detonated their bombs on the London public transportation system, three in the Underground and one on a city bus.  Fifty-six people, including the terrorists, were killed in the July 7 attacks and more than 700 were injured.  Three of the bombers were UK-born citizens of Pakistani descent; the
Police officers stand in front of a sealed off area around a bus in London after the July 7 terrorist attacks.  (AFP Photo/Carl de Souza)
other was a British national of Jamaican descent and a convert to Islam.  A video of one of the bombers, Mohammed Siddique Khan, was released through the media after the attacks, and in that video Khan attributed his act of violence to anger over UK foreign policy.

A separate group of terrorists attempted to detonate bombs in the London Underground on July 21, but those bombs failed to detonate completely and did not cause any casualties.  UK authorities have arrested individuals in connection with this attack; the suspected bombers are East and West African in origin.

Government authorities reported that at least two attempted attacks have been thwarted since July.  In August, Prime Minister Blair outlined plans to strengthen counterterrorism efforts in the United Kingdom by augmenting government authority to deport and exclude foreigners engaged in extolling extremism and justifying terrorism, increasing powers to arrest and detain suspects, and proscribing groups and individuals glorifying or inciting terrorism.  Prime Minister Blair met with senior leaders of the Muslim community in Britain for advice on how to curb radicalization and to solicit support from Muslim communities to do the same. 

The United Kingdom has played a leadership role in working to develop an understanding of radicalization and in seeking to identify the structural and motivational factors that may drive the terrorist recruitment process.  The British government worked with its European counterparts to stimulate discussion on radicalization and has sought to work with its domestic Muslim populations to identify how this process unfolds and how communities and governments can prevent the spread and appeal of extremist ideology.

The additional measures that the Prime Minister detailed in his August address to the nation have yet to be passed into law, although a draft Terror Bill is making its way through Parliament.  The government engaged in a series of bilateral negotiations to allow the return of foreigners to their home countries, with a specific understanding that those individuals will not be subject to human rights abuses.

The July attacks in London pointed to a new phenomena in global terrorism, that of homegrown terrorism in Europe.  While the United Kingdom has experienced homegrown terrorism in the past linked to Northern Ireland, the July 7 bombings were the first successful attacks carried out by UK-born Islamic extremists.  It is not yet clear if the July 7 and 21 terrorists had any ties to al-Qaida or other international terrorist organizations.  The July 7 terrorists traveled out of the United Kingdom to Pakistan prior to the attacks.  The Khan video suggests that at a minimum Khan affiliated himself with the goals of al-Qaida.

The United Kingdom simultaneously held the presidency of the European Union and the chairmanship of the G8.  The United Kingdom used its leadership of both entities to advance intra-EU cooperation on counterterrorism measures and policy.  During the UK presidency of the EU, the EU agreed on a counterterrorism strategy and a review of the problem of radicalization and terrorist recruitment within Europe.

The United States and the United Kingdom work closely together within the United Nations and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to deny terrorists and their supporters access to the international financial system.  The United Kingdom has strong legal provisions for freezing assets related to terrorist financing, including Terrorism (UN Measures) Order 2001, the al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2001, and the Antiterrorism Crime and Security Act 2001.

When Prime Minister Blair gave his August 5 address listing his intentions to strengthen UK counterterrorism measures, he said he would seek to designate Hizb-ut Tahir (HT), an international group with operations in Britain.  This group was not proscribed, however.  Individuals, including prominent Muslim leaders within the United Kingdom, argued that the group, while endorsing violent action elsewhere in the world, does not manifest itself in the same manner in the United Kingdom.  On other matters of proscription, the United States and the United Kingdom had regular consultations.

Northern Ireland

In Northern Ireland, Republican and Loyalist paramilitary organizations increasingly shifted their activity from political actions to criminal racketeering.  This shift began with the 1994 ceasefires of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), and has accelerated further since the Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998.

Two relatively small "dissident" Republican paramilitaries, the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) and the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), continue to advocate the use of armed violence to support their goal of uniting the northern and southern parts of Ireland.  Loyalist paramilitaries also have a presence in the Republic of Ireland.  In July, the Provisional IRA announced that it was ending its armed campaign and would pursue its goals through exclusively peaceful means.  In September, the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning announced that the Provisional IRA had put all of its weapons "beyond use."

Uzbekistan

The potential for Islamic extremism and acts of international terrorism remained significant in Uzbekistan.  Supporters of terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), al-Qaida, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), and the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) remained active in the region.  Members of these groups expressed anti-U.S. sentiments and have attacked U.S. interests in the past, including a 2004 suicide bombing at the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent.

Information continued to suggest that some of these groups might be planning attacks in the region, possibly against U.S. Government facilities, Americans, or American interests.  As a result, the Department of State authorized in June the departure of American Embassy Tashkent's non-emergency personnel and family members.  The departure status was lifted in July, but U.S. Government personnel and facilities continued to operate at a heightened state of alert.

Uzbekistan was among the first states to support U.S. efforts in the global war on terror.  Beginning in 2001, Uzbekistan hosted U.S. military forces within its borders.  In July, however, the government formally invoked its right to request termination within 180 days of an agreement allowing U.S. access to the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) airbase and overflight of Uzbekistan.  Uzbek authorities continued to stress the importance of the country’s counterterrorism cooperation and said the decision to end access at K2 did not signal Uzbekistan's withdrawal from international counterterrorism efforts.  As of December, Uzbekistan continued to permit U.S. overflight of its territory in support of ongoing operations in Afghanistan.  The United States fully vacated the Karshi-Khanabad base on November 21.

Tashkent hosts the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) Regional Antiterrorism Center Secretariat (RATS), which remained in the early stages of development.  It began to focus on operational activities, such as developing a coordinated list of terrorist groups and facilitating joint counterterrorism exercises among SCO member states.  Uzbekistan also participated in UNODC and OSCE programs aimed at ensuring that it enacts appropriate terrorism legislation.